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ABSTRACT
Based on information gathered from the United States armed services, the Royal Navy and the
Australian Defence Force, best practices in corporate America, and the academic literature, this
report provides forward leaning practices and actionable recommendations to Commander, Navy
Recruiting Command (CNRC). The goal is to improve and best align Navy Recruiting practices
for the Millennial and post-Millennial generations. To achieve this, we: (1) identified and eval-
uated past alternative recruiting efforts, (2) assessed the literature on trends in the Millennial and
post-Millennial generations, and (3) synthesized this information to pose future Navy recruiting
strategies. Ultimately, this report concludes that the military recruiting community must establish a
program of research and experimentation in order to learn how to improve military recruiting.
v
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Executive Summary
This research sought to address the following questions:
• What strategies should Navy recruiting be considering to best entice the Millennial generation
to enlist in the Navy?
• What strategic plans and decisions should Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC)
be making today to lay the groundwork for the post-Millennial recruit of tomorrow?
The original goal of this project was to summarize and synthesize the quantitative evidence – which
as initially planned was to be the result of formal experiments – of how various recruiting alter-
natives and options performed. However, due to the dearth of empirical evidence and recruiting
experiments, the research methodology was ultimately largely qualitative: Assessing, compiling,
and evaluating the published literature on military recruiting and the Millennial generation, as well
as all unpublished Service- and recruiting command-specific information and evidence we could
obtain, and interviewing subject matter experts in the Services’ recruiting commands and the Royal
Navy and Australian Defence Force recruiting commands.
Thus, for the literature review, this report compiles and evaluates the published literature on (1)
military recruiting and (2) the Millennial and post-Millennial generations. The military recruiting
literature review has a two-fold focus:
• Identifying the full range of alternative recruiting strategies that have been proposed.
• Compiling the available qualitative and quantitative data about the performance of those
strategies that have been implemented.
The Millennial generation literature review is focused on:
• Identifying generational trends relevant to military service and military recruiting.
• Understanding how civilian and commercial recruiting practices are changing to accommo-
date the Millennial generation.
Upon completion of the literature review, the research team then conducted site visits, interviewing
military recruiting-related subject matter experts with all U.S. service recruiting commands, the




Due to the lack of empirical evidence, this report proposes potential improvements to Navy recruit-
ing, all of which need to be carefully evaluated before full-scale implementation. This leads to one
of the report’s major recommendations: the military recruiting community must establish a program
of research and experimentation in order to learn how to improve military recruiting.
Below is the complete set of recommendations. See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of each of
the recommendations and the supporting findings upon which they are based.
MILLENNIAL AND POST-MILLENNIAL RECRUITING RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Outfit Navy recruiters with the latest smartphones and laptops.
2. Refresh Navy recruiter technology (smartphones and laptops or their future equivalents) at
least every three years.
3. Use commercial networks to support Navy recruiter communication systems and operations.
4. Expand NRC’s virtual recruiting enterprise, to include increasing capacity and providing the
capability to initiate applications that can then be passed electronically to local recruiters.
5. Ensure all Navy recruiting websites, social media, and all other Internet-based communica-
tions are optimized for mobile devices like smartphones.
6. Structure Navy systems, policies & procedures, marketing, and recruiter training so that po-
tential applicants have a consistent experience throughout the recruiting process.
7. Implement policies and procedures that allow, encourage, and train Navy recruiters to estab-
lish a local social media presence and to use that presence to effectively recruit in their local
communities.
NRC-AS-A-LEARNING-ORGANIZATION STRATEGIC CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS
8. Establish a program of relevant experiment-based research that will inform how NRC adapts
to future recruiting environments and challenges and enables data driven decision-making.
9. Create an organization within NRC with the expertise, resources, authority, and freedom to
conduct recruiting experiments.
OTHER RECRUITING STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS
10. Build a robust NRC process improvement program.
11. Re-establish the various DoD-wide recruiting working groups and conferences.
12. Implement a bi-annual recruiting conference with allied military recruiting organizations with
all-volunteer forces.
13. Enact an exchange program with other U.S. service recruiting organizations and allied mili-
tary organizations.
14. Explore experimentation with Royal Navy, Australian Defence Force, and other non-U.S. all
volunteer military recruiting models.
15. Develop programs and tools to transition knowledge generated through experimentation and
data analysis to practitioners in the field via NRC N7.
xviii
Ultimately, these recommendations can be summarized into two overarching themes:
1. To be maximally effective, NRC and Navy recruiters must have and constructively use the lat-
est technology to connect with the Millennial and post-Millennial generations. This involves:
a. Building and maintaining a modern technology infrastructure; and,
b. Managing the content, software, and social media aspects of the technology for a good
customer experience.
2. To become a true learning organization, NRC must:
a. Establish an experiment-based research program that will explore break-through inno-
vations in military recruiting;
b. Expand its process improvement program to facilitate incremental improvement of cur-
rent systems and processes;
c. Coordinate with other recruiting services to glean lessons learned and benchmark cur-
rent NRC processes against the other services; and,
d. Implement a set of programs and tools to enable the transition and adoption of successful
experimental outcomes and best practices to the recruiting force.
Establishing an Experiment-based Research Program
The recommendation to establish an experiment-based research program is consistent with NRC’s
strategy to “Become a Learning Organization” (CNRC, 2012, enclosure (1), p. 9), but it extends
well beyond the notion of developing and implementing knowledge management systems – it is
about generating knowledge. This recommendation is also in accordance with a recent Secretary of
Defense memorandum on innovation, where Secretary Hagel wrote: “We are entering an era where
American dominance in key warfighting domains is eroding, and we must find new and creative
ways to sustain, and in some areas expand, our advantages even as we deal with more limited
resources.” He went on to say, “we need to continue to further examine our business practices and
find ways to be more efficient and effective” (Hagel, 2014).
To establish an NRC capability to conduct rigorous and effective experiments will require creation
of an organization within NRC that has the necessary:
• Expertise, which includes both statistical expertise to rigorously design and analyze the ex-
periments and recruiting expertise to help design, select and appropriately implement the
experiments in the field;
• Resources, which includes both sufficient numbers of the personnel just described, but also
access to actual recruiting resources so that the experiments can be conducted in the field
under real-world conditions;
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“If you always do what you’ve always done,
you’ll always get what you’ve always got...if you’re lucky” (Colley, 2013).
• Authority, which includes both the authority to conduct experiments within the regions and
districts and the ability to cut across organizational lines; and,
• Freedom, which includes both the ability to draw from various parts of NRC to support ex-
periments and, most importantly, the capability to conduct experiments outside of region,
district, and station mission goals.
In particular, freeing experiments from the pressure of organizational recruiting goals is absolutely
critical to their success because experiments conducted within the recruit goaling system will fail to
identify differential and improved recruiting performance. While doing so will require short-term
impositions on the Navy recruiting enterprise, in which some recruiting assets will not be working
directly towards the current mission, an appropriately executed continuing program of experimenta-
tion will ultimately result in NRC conducting operations more efficiently and effectively. Over the
the long term, this will free up resources.
Conclusions
The bottom line of this research is that there is little to no relevant information in the commer-
cial sector or the academic literature upon which to determine how to best recruit the Millennial
and post-Millennial generations into the military. And, while the current recruiting processes have
served the Navy reasonably well for decades, there may well come a time when they do not, and
by then it will be painful to figure out what went wrong and costly to correct. The cartoon and
associated caption above, compliments of the Royal Navy, expresses this point very well. Thus,
rather than rely on luck, the overarching purpose of this report is to help the NRC evolve into an
xx
organization that can learn how to best recruit in the 21st century.
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Any man who may be asked in this century what he did to make his life worthwhile...can
respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction, ‘I served in the United States Navy’.
John F. Kennedy (1917 – 1963)
As President Kennedy said – and experienced – serving in the Navy is an honorable calling and
Navy veterans can be justifiably proud of their service. The United States Navy Recruiting Com-
mand (NRC) is in the business of helping young men and women find their place within the naval
profession so that they too can say, ‘I served in the United States Navy.’
Over the past decade, NRC has developed and fielded resources intended to conduct recruiting
operations more effectively and efficiently. However, the basic recruiting model, which is largely
structured around the physical interaction of Navy recruiters with potential recruits, has remained
fundamentally unchanged for decades. This model is based on placing young, active duty recruiters
in recruiting stations throughout the country, tasking the recruiters to produce a particular quota of
new recruits to meet a monthly goal, and having them process their potential and new recruits via
Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS).
The physical interaction between recruiters and recruits will almost surely continue to be important
to successful Navy recruiting, since new recruits typically want to speak to someone in the Navy
prior to enlisting. But there may be ways to modify or augment the current processes and infras-
tructure to make it cheaper and/or more effective for enlisting the Millennial and post-Millennial
generations, particularly with respect to the continuing penetration of mobile electronic devices into
the youth population.
Over the past decade, the Services have experimented with various alternative approaches to recruit-
ing and recruitment, including joint recruiting stations, the elimination of recruiting stations (where
recruiters are outfitted with a suite of mobile electronics and other tools), and even virtual recruiting
on-line via the Internet. Some of these experiments have been successful and others have not, either
because recruiter performance was lower than desired, costs were higher than desired, or for other
reasons.
It has been said that the Millennial and post-Millennial generations differ in that they are tech-savvy,
connected, multi-taskers who want instant gratification, collaboration, transparency, and career ad-
vancement (Abbot, 2013). Whether these characteristics actually describe an entire generation, and
whether they are relevant to military recruiting, is an open question. However, there is no question
that the current Navy recruiting processes have largely remained static while the on-going digital
revolution has dramatically changed how youth now communicate and obtain information.
1
Table 1.1: Technology Penetration in the United States (CTIA – The Wireless Association, 2014;
index mundi, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013, 2014).
1984 1994 2000 2010
Percent of U.S. population with a cell phone: <0.1 6.2 38.8 97.1
Percent of U.S. households with a computer: 8.2 22.9 51.0 76.7
Percent of U.S. households using the Internet: negligible 2.3 41.5 71.7
For example, Table 1.1 shows that in the past 30 years in the United States cell phone penetration
has gone from virtually zero to almost 100% of the American public, from adults to teenagers and
young children. Similarly, household computer and Internet penetration has gone from negligible to
roughly three out of four households having a computer and Internet access. And, just six years after
the release of the first smartphone in 2007,1 more than half of Americans own smartphones (Smith,
2013) and some predict that by 2020 virtually all cell phones will be smartphones (Dediu, 2013).
The result of this massive technology and communication revolution is reflected in a September
2012 PewResearch survey that concludes that “fully 95% of all teens ages 12-17 are now online”
(PewResearch, 2013).
This suggests a number of questions relevant to the future of Navy recruiting, including:
• What strategies should Navy recruiting be considering to best entice the Millennial generation
to enlist in the Navy?
• What strategic plans and decisions should Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC)
be making today to lay the groundwork for the post-Millennial recruit of tomorrow?
1.1 Research Objectives & Approach
The overall goal of this research is to identify potential future strategies for recruiting from the
Millennial and post-Millennial generations. The specific research tasks were:
1. Assess the literature on trends in the Millennial and post-Millennial generations with a focus
on how well current and previous recruiting efforts align with how these generations are likely
to want to interact with Navy recruiting.
2. Identify and evaluate past alternative recruiting efforts with an emphasis on assessing the
quantitative evidence (if any) of performance.
3. Pose possible future recruiting strategies for the Navy along with rigorous quantitative meth-
ods for evaluating the performance of the various strategies and their components.
The original goal of this project was to summarize and synthesize the quantitative evidence – which
we initially expected would be the result of formal experiments – of how various recruiting alterna-
tives and options performed. However, due to the dearth of experiments that we discuss in Chapter
5, the research methodology was ultimately largely qualitative: Assessing, compiling, and eval-
1The first generation iPhone was released on June 29, 2007.
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Table 1.2: Site visits conducted in support of the research.
Site Date(s) of Visit
U.S. Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) 2 Feb., 29-30 April 2014
Naval Recruiting District, San Francisco 17 April 2014
Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (NPRST) 1 May 2014
U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) 1 May 2014
U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM) 2 May 2014
U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) 5 June 2014
U.S. Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS) 17 June 2014
Captain Naval Recruiting, Royal Navy 20-21 August 2014
Australian Defence Force Recruiting (DFR) 27-28 August 2014
Various recruiting stations (USA, USAF, USN, USMC) 18 Sept. to 17 Oct. 2014
uating the published literature on military recruiting and the Millennial generation, as well as all
unpublished Service- and recruiting command-specific information and evidence we could obtain,
and interviewing subject matter experts in the Services’ recruiting commands and the Royal Navy
and Australian Defence Force recruiting commands.
In particular, for the literature review, we compiled and evaluated the published literature on (1)
military recruiting and (2) the Millennial and post-Millennial generations. The military recruiting
literature review had a two-fold focus:
1. identifying the full range of alternative recruiting strategies that have been proposed, and
2. compiling the available qualitative and quantitative data about the performance of those strate-
gies that have been implemented.
The Millennial generation literature review was focused on:
1. identifying generational trends relevant to military service and military recruiting, and
2. understanding how civilian and commercial recruiting practices are changing to accommodate
the Millennial generation.
Upon completion of the literature review, we then conducted site visits to interview military recruiting-
related subject matter experts (SMEs) with the goal of obtaining as much unpublished Service- and
recruiting command-specific information and evidence as possible. As shown in Table 1.2, these
site visits were conducted with all U.S. Service recruiting commands, the U.S. Military Entrance
Processing Command (MEPCOM), and with the Royal Navy and the Australian Defence Force. As
with the published literature review, we placed an emphasis on collecting empirical evidence about
the performance of the various alternative recruiting methods, though ultimately we found very little
documented empirical evidence.
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The research focused on identifying potentially useful changes to physical (and virtual) recruiting
processes 15 to 20 years into the future, with an emphasis on Navy active component enlisted
recruiting because it comprises 74% of NRC’s recruiting mission. The research specifically and
purposely did not focus on:
• Evaluating advertising for military recruiting;
• Assessing or proposing incentives to attract recruits; or,
• Mapping the current recruiting process in any detail.
While clearly applicable to increasing the pool of qualified applicants, questions associated with
how advertising and incentives should be applied to increase military recruitment are tangential to
this research effort that is specifically focused on how the recruiting process itself should be modi-
fied to best recruit Millennials and post-Millennials. For those interested in advertising for military
recruiting, see Stoker & Mehay (2011), Dertouzos & Garber (2003, 2009) and the associated lit-
erature. Similarly, those interested in military recruiting and retention incentives should consult
that literature, including Asch et al. (2010), Dertouzos & Garber (2009), and Asch & Dertouzos
(1994). Finally, CNRC has recently fully mapped the current Navy recruiting process (see NRC
2007, 2010).
1.2 Motivation for the Research
The motivation for this research is straightforward: the basic process of U.S. military recruiting
has not changed for decades but both applicant behavior and civilian communications and other
infrastructure have. This raises the question of whether the recruiting process could and should be
modified to best attract applicants now and in the future. Figure 1.1, drawn from “Naval Recruit
Marketing” by the Royal Navy (Colley, 2013), speaks directly to this point. The caption is “If you
always do what you’ve always done, you’ll always get what you’ve always got...if you’re lucky.”
Annually, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command assesses “risks to mission.” In the draft FY14




4. Fit vs. fill;
5. Competition for diverse talent;
6. Declining DoD budgets;
7. Continuing issues of the economy, workforce and the job market;
8. Recruiter manning levels;
9. Goal reductions.
Currently, this list does not include the potential degradation of the current recruiting methods with
respect to changes in society, technology, or other factors that might lead towards suboptimal per-
formance or, at the most extreme, obsolescence of the existing recruiting processes and methods.
That is, the current Navy Recruiting plans and strategy assumes the continued successful operation
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Figure 1.1: “If you always do what you’ve always done, you’ll always get what you’ve always
got...if you’re lucky” (Colley, 2013).
of the recruiting enterprise using existing methods, yet as Figure 1.1 suggests, what worked in the
past may or may not continue to work effectively in the future.
Indeed, particularly now, as information technology innovations are disrupting many business mod-
els (e.g., Amazon vs. traditional publishing; AirBnb vs. traditional hotels; Uber vs. traditional com-
mercial transportation; etc.), there is some question as to whether the current U.S. military recruiting
business model must also adapt with the times. Of course, the military does not have to worry that
a competitor will arise and directly disrupt its recruiting business model, but that does not mean
Navy recruiting can be complacent. The Navy competes with the other U.S. military services and
the commercial sector for talent and outmoded recruiting practices may hinder future performance,
particularly if potential recruits are lost because these competitors are better positioned to attract the
Millennial and post-Millennial generations. Furthermore, in an era of shrinking budgets and per-
sonnel, it is critical that the Navy identify the most efficient and effective recruiting practices. With
this in mind, this research was sponsored by Navy Recruiting Command and funded by OPNAV
N1 precisely to look at whether and how Navy recruiting practices might need to change to most
efficiently and effectively recruit members of the Millennial and post-Millennial generations.
1.3 Summary
Drawing on information from the other U.S. military recruiting commands, two allied militaries,
best practices in the corporate arena, and the academic literature, the goal of this research is to iden-
tify potential future strategies for recruiting from the Millennial and post-Millennial generations. In
conducting our research, we sought to identify and evaluate past alternative recruiting efforts with
an emphasis on assessing the quantitative evidence (if any) of performance with the goal of iden-
tifying proven recruiting strategies and methods that Commander, Navy Recruiting Command can
implement to improve and best align Navy Recruiting practices for the future.
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While this research is focused on generational differences, we conducted it with a healthy skepticism
of generational descriptions, particularly those in the popular media that, for example, describe how
the Millennial generation is failing to perform in the workplace. Our skepticism is based on the fact
that many discussions of generational differences read like horoscopes, with little scientific merit,
and because every new generation is criticized by the generations that came before. This can be
traced back to at least 8 BC:
What do the ravages of time not injure? Our parents’ age (worse than our grand-
parents’) has produced us, more worthless still, who will soon give rise to a yet more
vicious generation.
Quintus Horatius Flaccus (65 - 8 BC)
Roman poet2
More recently:
Each generation imagines itself to be more intelligent than the one that went before it,
and wiser than the one that comes after it.
George Orwell (1945)
American author
I get a little cranky with the whole business about kids not having attention spans. This
reminds me of the usual business of thinking that the next generation is hopeless. Every
generation has said that about every younger generation.
Robin McKinley (2010)
American author3
Hence, this research is based on the premise that generations are more similar than different, that the
differences between individuals within generations is larger than the average differences between
generations, and that observable behavioral and experiential differences are as important or more
important than the more amorphous attitudinal differences.
The report is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the military recruiting approach used
by the U.S. military services, with an emphasis on U.S. Navy’s recruiting. In this chapter, we also
describe how the Royal Navy and the Australian Defense Force conduct military recruiting. In
Chapter 3, we discuss the various generational cohorts as described in the social science and pop-
ular literature, with an emphasis on the Millennial and post-Millennial generations, including their
predicted propensity to serve, recommended methods for effectively communicating with them, and
theories regarding recruitment methods. In Chapter 4, we summarize the various recruiting organi-
zation, system, and process improvements that have been proposed in the published literature and
in Chapter 5 we describe past experimental efforts designed to learn about how to effectively recruit
for the military. Finally, in Chapter 6 we bring all of the research together and propose potential
Millennial and post-Millennial recruiting strategies and improvements.
2As quoted in The Encarta Book of Quotations (Swainson, 2000, p. 446).




Recruiting is hard. It’s just finding the needles in the haystack.
Steve Jobs (1955-2011)
In support of this research, we examined the current recruiting processes of multiple military orga-
nizations against which to compare U.S. Navy recruiting: the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S.
Marine Corps, as well as the Royal Navy and the Australian Defence Force. In this chapter, we
briefly describe each, starting with the U.S. Navy.
2.1 U.S. Navy Recruiting
The United States Navy Recruiting Command was established April 6, 1971 (NRC, 2014a). It has
one command headquarters located in Millington, Tennessee. The command is divided into two
regions, each of which has 13 recruiting districts; see Figure 2.1 (NRC, 2014d). NRC recruits in
all 50 states and outside of the United States in locations where a sizable recruitable market exists,
including Europe, Japan, Guam, and Puerto Rico.
Figure 2.1: Map of Navy Recruiting Command regions and districts (NRC, 2014c).
7
Figure 2.2: Active component enlisted mission for 2012-2014 and 2015 projection (CNRC, 2014).
Figure 2.3: CNRC recruiting resources in $M (CNRC, 2014).
In fiscal year 2014, Navy Recruiting had a “mission” to recruit slightly more than 40,000 active
component (AC) enlisted personnel, just over 2,500 active component officers, and a combined
reserve component mission of approximately 6,300 personnel with an operational budget of just
over $56 million. CNRC estimated the fiscal year 2010 cost of a high quality male recruit to be
approximately $12,000 (NRC, 2014b). Figures 2.2 and 2.3 put the AC enlisted mission and CNRC
budget in historical context of fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and show projections for fiscal year 2015
(CNRC, 2014).
The Navy Recruiting Command consists of roughly 6,000 personnel (recruiters and support staff,
both military and civilian) of which approximately 4,000 are active recruiters. The recruiters are
located in approximately 1,450 local recruiting offices, largely in strip malls, throughout the United
States (NRC, 2014d). For example, Figure 2.4 shows the Navy recruiting station in Salinas, Cali-
fornia.4
As shown in Figure 2.1, each of the regions is responsible for specific territory in the United States,
Europe, Japan, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Each of the regions then assign
territory to their districts who subsequently assign territory to each district station and the stations
assign territory to each recruiter. In a similar fashion, CNRC assigns monthly recruiting missions
(production goals) to each region and this propagates down through the chain of command to each
recruiter. The result is that each recruiter has an assigned territory and monthly mission to achieve
within that territory.
As described in the Navy Recruiting Manual – Enlisted, there are eight steps in the current Navy
4Note that the Navy recruiting station is located adjacent to an Air Force recruiting station under the “Armed Forces
Career Center” signage. The Army’s and Marine Corps’ recruiting stations are co-located in a nearby but separate
recruiting office.
8
Figure 2.4: Navy recruiting station in Salinas, California (co-located with an Air Force recruiting
station). Source: original photo by the authors.
recruiting process. The following is an excerpt from the recruiting manual (NRC, 2011, chapter1,
section 6, p. 1) briefly describing each of the steps.
a. Market I.D. Maintaining a continuous flow of new names on a continuous basis
is essential to a recruiters’ success.
b. Prospecting. This is the means by which a prospect is contacted. The purpose of
contacting an individual is to arrange and conduct an interview with the prospect.
c. Screening. The process of evaluating a prospect’s eligibility as defined in Volume
II of this instruction and aids in eliminating those prospects who do not meet the
requirements.
d. Selling. Persuading a prospect to enlist in the United States Navy using skills,
techniques, and motivation. Selling occurs during a face-to-face interview with a
potentially qualified applicant and their significant others or parents.
e. Processing. Applicants applying for enlistment in the USN or USNR must com-
plete mental testing, a physical examination, or re-screening at the processing
station by MEPS representatives, and classification. Parental consent is required
prior to processing a 17-year-old prospect.
f. Enlistment. The applicant is enlisted into either the Delayed Entry Program or the
Selected Reserve.
g. Delayed Entry Program. Applicants who enlist for active duty join the Delayed
Entry Program until their date to report to Recruit Training Command (RTC). The
DEP program is designed to produce referrals and prepare Future Sailors for RTC.
h. Shipping. Involves sending individuals to RTC, or, in some cases, directly to their
initial duty station.
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This is an active recruiting paradigm: the Navy recruiting system (as well as all of the other U.S.
military Services) is predicated on recruiters actively soliciting and selling the military to a core
market of 17–24 year old potential recruits. Each Service conducts extensive marketing efforts via
mass media, but the presumption is that recruiters will actively solicit potential recruits to join the
military. Advertising is used as a means to raise awareness of the military, to increase the propensity
of individuals to join, and to sway key influencers, but it is largely not used as a mechanism to
motivate individuals to seek out and join the military in the absence of active recruiting.
The Navy recruiting model is also one in which each recruiter is largely responsible for conduct-
ing all the necessary tasks – from developing prospects to closing the sale – within his or her own
territory. Day-to-day activities of Navy recruiters include making telephone cold calls to potential
recruits; staffing the recruiting station to meet walk-in prospects; canvassing his or her territory,
particularly the high schools within the territory; meeting with potential recruits to screen them for
suitability and selling them on the Navy; completing and managing the necessary paperwork to
process an applicant, including conducting the applicant to and from the Military Entrance Process
Station; and managing individuals who have signed contracts and are in the recruiter’s the Delayed
Entry Program (DEP) queue awaiting shipment to bootcamp. In many ways, the U.S. military re-
cruiting methods harken back to the door-to-door sales approach of the 1930s and 1940s, epitomized
by the Fuller Brush salesman, where each recruiter is largely an individual entrepreneur.
Of course, recruiters do not operate entirely independently. As previously described, there is a clear
chain of command from the Commander, Naval Recruiting Command down to each and every in-
dividual recruiter, and this chain of command provides supervision and oversight of the recruiter’s
activities. NRC also provides all the necessary infrastructure, including recruiting stations, associ-
ated information technology, government vehicles, etc. Furthermore, NRC manages the Navy.com
website, a virtual recruiting enterprise, and other infrastructure that generates leads for the recruiters.
In terms of virtual recruiting, in 2005 NRC contracted for a company to conduct “blueprinting”5
of potential applicants. About four years ago, this effort then transitioned into a cyber recruiting
effort, run by NRC N9, which conducts live chats with interested visitors to the Navy.com website
(Phillips, 2014). The current NRC cyber recruiting operation consists of a small cadre of experi-
enced recruiters and former recruiters who staff the chat function at Navy.com, answering website
visitor questions and blueprinting interested potential applicants for follow-up by the applicant’s
local recruiter.
The Navy has met its enlisted recruiting goals for the past seven years (DoD, 2014; Langford,
2014), though success in military recruiting is a strong function of the health of the U.S. economy.
For example, in the late 1990s each of the Army, Navy, and Air Force missed their goals for various
years (GAO, 2000). However, this is evidence that the current system works and is successful at
meeting its objectives. Results from the April–September 2013 New Recruit Survey (Brewer et al.,
2014) suggests that the current recruiting system works, at least in terms of how new recruits view
5“Blueprinting” is the process of collecting information from an interested prospect so that when a recruiter contacts
the prospect the recruiter will be best able to sell the Navy. “Blueprinting is fact-finding, before and during the interview.
One of the main reasons for blueprinting is to reduce or eliminate call reluctance” (NRC, 2011, chapter 4, section 1, p. 1).
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Figure 2.5: Recruiting Force 2020: Navy Recruiting Strategic Plan (CNRC, 2012).
their interactions with the Navy recruiting system:
• 90% of new recruits were satisfied or very satisfied with their recruiter.
– Another five percent were neutral, so that only five percent were dissatisfied.
• 82% of new recruits were satisfied or very satisfied with the recruiting process.
– Another 12% were neutral, so that only six percent were dissatisfied.
• 50% of Navy recruits agree or strongly agree that “The Recruiter provided my parent(s) with
information on the benefits of joining the Navy.”
Figure 2.5 is an excerpt from the Navy Recruiting Command’s Strategic Plan Recruiting Force 2020
dated September 27, 2012 (CNRC, 2012, enclosure (1), p. 10), which summarizes NRC’s vision,
goals, and lines of operation:
• Vision: “To be the premier recruiting force, trained and educated, using innovation and tech-
nology, to build America’s Navy for tomorrow.”
• Goals for 2020:
– “Increase Organizational Productivity and Capacity to Meet All Missions”
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– “Develop a Very High Quality workforce grounded in commitment and workplace sat-
isfaction”
– “Measure and Manage Future Risk”
• Lines of Operation:
– People & Organizational Structure
– Systems & Processes
– Marketing & Awareness
– Learning & Growth
Navy Recruiting Command’s 2013 Business Plan notes that NRC must “continually adapt our busi-
ness to the dynamic recruiting market. The recruiting market is shaped by social and economic
pressures and is stressed by fiscal resource reductions and fleet demand” (CNRC, 2014, enclosure
(1), p. 3). It goes on to list and assign a number of initiatives tied to the Lines of Operation listed
above. These initiatives are intended to transition from Navy recruiting processes that are “slow
[and] labor intensive,” “stove-piped,” and “hierarchical” with “lengthy cycle time[s]” that are “fa-
cility dependent” and “not adaptive to quick market change” into “mobile recruiting” processes that
are “fast / mobile / multipurpose,” “responsive,” and “IT connected” and that operate at the “speed
of the market” (CNRC, 2014, enclosure (1), p. 12).
2.2 U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command
Navy recruiting, as well as recruiting at each of the other U.S. military services, is inextricably
intertwined with the United States Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) which has
responsibility for administering the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), all re-
cruit medical testing, and for shipping all new recruits off to their initial training within their re-
spective service. Per its strategic plan, MEPCOM’s mission is to evaluate “applicants by applying
established DoD standards during processing in order to determine eligibility for military service”
(MEPCOM, 2013, p. 2).
MEPCOM was established in July of 1976 and became a separate command in 1979 with the U.S.
Army as the Executive Agent (NRC, 2014a). As shown in Figure 2.6, MEPCOM has one com-
mand headquarters located in Great Lakes, Illinois, and the organization is divided into two sectors
each consisting of six battalions, where each battalion has five or six Military Entrance Processing
Stations (MEPS) (MEPCOM, 2014a,b; quizlet, 2014). In total, MEPCOM has 65 MEPS and 365
Military Entrance Test (MET) sites located across the country. In 2012, across all the services, in
over a million MEPS visits by 540,000 applicants , MEPCOM conducted almost 450,000 enlistment
tests and gave almost 300,000 medical exams in order to ship 211,000 enlistees (MEPCOM, 2013,
p. 9).
The military services process applicants with MEPCOM via the “USMEPCOM Integrated Resource
System” or USMIRS. In its 2013 strategic plan, MEPCOM described a future concept of operations
in which MEPCOM would transition from USMIRS to the Virtual Interactive Processing System
(VIPS) (MEPCOM, 2013, p. 28). Under this plan, by 2025 applicants and recruiters would be
be able to conduct virtual processing where the applicant could initiate their application “anytime,
anywhere” via the Internet, MEPCOM could virtually interface with the applicant, and all records
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Figure 2.6: U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command sectors and battalions.
would be electronic. However, the VIPS program was cancelled (ITdashboard, 2014; LaCasse,
2014) and thus for the foreseeable future MEPCOM and the services’ recruiters will continue to use
USMIRS.
A key characteristic of the current U.S. military recruiting model in which all recruits must be pro-
cessed through MEPCOM is that recruiters typically take potential recruits to and from the MEPS.
This may require a significant investment of recruiter time as MEPS may be located a significant
distance from a recruiter’s territory. For example, in northern California there are two MEPS, one in
San Jose and the other in Sacramento. Thus, recruiters from the Navy recruiting station in Salinas
(see Figure 2.4) have a three to four hour round trip travel time each time they take a prospective
recruit to process at the MEPS.
2.3 Other U.S. Services’ Recruiting
All U.S. military services use essentially the same recruiting model described in Section 2.1 for the
Navy. The main difference is one of magnitude, where as Table 2.1 shows, the Army has the largest
recruiting mission and associated recruiting staff, followed by the Navy, Marine Corps, and the
Air Force. As Table 2.1 shows, in total, roughly 18 thousand recruiters in 5,500 recruiting stations
throughout the United States recruited more than 167 thousand people to serve in the military on
active duty. When the National Guard and Reserves are also accounted for, the entire enterprise is
even larger.
In terms of differences in the recruiting models, the Army recently transitioned to assigning goals
at the recruiting station (“center”) level, rather than at the individual recruiter level. The idea is that
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Services’ Recruiting Operations. (Data sources: AFRS, 2014b; DoD,
2013; NRC, 2014d; USAREC, 2014a; USMC, 2014; Whittle, 2014a)
U.S. Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps
Recruiting Recruiting Recruiting Recruiting
Command Service Command Command
2013 AC Mission 69,000 26,275 40,112 32,200
2013 AC Assessions 69,154 26,275 40,112 32,215
Number of production recruiters 9,500 1,149 4,000 3,760
Number of recruiting stations 1,400 1,108 1,450 1,583
recruiters within stations can specialize on certain tasks or functions in support of the center (Nelson,
2014). This allows center leaders to task organize their unit to complete the mission, sharing the
burden of meeting the goal across a team rather than a single individual. Whether this method
for assigning goals is an improvement over the traditional method of assigning goals to individual
recruiters remains to be seen, but it is a departure from the Navy model described in Section 2.1.
Another difference between Army and Navy recruiting is that USAREC has developed a large and
sophisticated Virtual Recruiting Center (USAREC, 2014b). As described in detail in Appendix A,
Section A.1, the mission of the Virtual Recruiting Center (VRC) is to:
...enhance the recruiting efforts of the United States Army Recruiting Command and
adjacent commands as required through the employment of virtual information tech-
nologies. The VRC also manages web based collaborative platforms and leverages
multiple social media activities to support USARECs prospecting, processing, Future
Soldier and Family requirements (USAREC, 2014b, slide 2).
As shown in Figure 2.7, the Virtual Recruiting Center is a large operation with seats for approxi-
mately 80 people to simultaneously conduct virtual recruiting:
The VRC’s social media efforts also include monitoring several Army Facebook pages
– including the U.S. Army, Go Army, USAREC Headquarters and U.S. Army Reserve
pages – and responding to any enlistment or recruiting-related posts/questions. There
is one representative assigned to each Facebook page per shift (day/night) and a team
of approximately 60 employees who are responsible for the other operations within the
VRC (USAREC, 2011).
Not only does the VRC promote an extensive virtual presence for the Army, but it is supported by
an applicant tracking system that allows the virtual recruiters to both generate leads and start an
electronic applicant record that can then subsequently be passed to a local recruiter to complete
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Figure 2.7: Picture of the USAREC’s Virtual Recruiting Center. (Source: USAREC, 2014b, slide 2,
see Appendix A.)
and execute a contract. During our visit to USAREC, we were told that five percent of all Army
contracts can be traced back to the VRC.
The Air Force differs from the other services in a couple of dimensions. First, the Air Force has
had the most extensive program for screening prospective recruiters. In particular, until last year a
Recruiter Screening Team extensively screened all applicants for recruiting duty (GAO, 1998). The
screening process included a:
...review of candidate’s application, EPR [enlisted performance report] history, credit
check, AMJAM [the Air Force’s Automated Military Justice Analysis and Management
system] check, medical records review of member/family, Unit Commander’s Recom-
mendation, and an extensive interview/assessment process. Potential applicants will be
administered the Emotional Quotient Inventory and the Emotional Quotient Interview,
which will be scored against the profile of successful recruiters to determine potential
skill match for recruiting duty (About.com, 2014).
As described in the briefing “Air Force Recruiting Service” (see Section A.2, page 83, of Appendix
A), Air Force recruiters are twice as productive as recruiters in any of the other services, where the
average Air Force recruiter generates slightly more than two contracts per month, while recruiters in
other services produce just under one contract per month on average. This performance differential
has existed since at least 1998, when the GAO (1998, p. 18) wrote,
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Officials from all the services acknowledged that part of this difference is due to the fact
that the Air Force is ‘the service of choice,’ receiving the most walk-in applicants and
having the lowest turnover rate of the services. However, the Commanding General of
the Air Force Recruiting Service attributes a large part of this success to the Air Force’s
intensive recruiter screening process.
However, last year the Air Force replaced its “Recruit the Recruiter” team with a new “Develop-
mental Special Duty” process (Trayers & Haygood, 2014). It is too soon to determine whether this
change will have an impact on recruiter performance.
The Air Force has just completed an extensive redesign of its legacy applicant tracking system,
the Air Force Recruiting Information Support System (AFRISS), rolling out AFRISS Total Force
(AFRISS TF) in June of this year. The new applicant tracking system is the product of an extensive
process improvement effort as described in AFRS Value Stream Mapping briefing (see Section A.3,
page 94).
AFRISS TF allows recruiters to upload applicant documents and electronically forward them to the
MEPS. This functionality eliminates the need to fax copies of documents, something Navy recruiters
still have to do. In addition, AFRISS TF has an off-line capability so recruiters can load data when
not connected to the Internet and then upload when they have Internet connectivity (AFRS, 2014a).
Finally, the Air Force is currently migrating to “Flight-centric” recruiting offices. As shown in
Appendix A, this involves reconfiguring Air Force recruiting offices into a hub-and-spoke system
in order to reduce and consolidate single recruiter offices. AFRS projects that they will reduce their
1,100 recruiting offices down to about 420 which will consist of about 160 “hub” offices and 200–
250 “spoke offices. This reduction in recruiting offices is combined with an increase of about 75
recruiters. See AFRS (2014b, slides 14-16) in Section A.2.
The Marine Corps is similar to the other services, though it very much emphasizes traditional face-
to-face recruiting. However, recruiting receives special emphasis within the Marine Corps where,
for example, the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) reports
directly to the Commandant – see USMC (2014) in Section A.4 of Appendix A. MCRC is an
“excepted command” within the Marine Corps, which means that it is manned at 100 percent of its
authorized end-strength (Whittle, 2014b).
The Marine Corps screens recruiter applicants and rewards those who perform well. Marine Corps
recruiting is one of four “B-billet” assignments (the others are Marine Security Guard, Drill In-
structor, and Marine Corps Security Forces). Per Marine Corps Order P1326.6D (USMC, 1999), a
Marine “who has successfully served a tour as a drill instructor, recruiter, Marine Security Guard
detachment commander or in a Marine Corps Security Force leadership billet is regarded as highly
qualified for promotion.” Furthermore, “Opportunities for meritorious promotion are authorized for
recruiters, drill instructors, and Marine Security Guards. Meritorious promotions will represent ...
58 percent and 60 percent [to staff sergeant and gunnery sergeant] for Marines serving on recruiter
duty...” (pp. 1-3 and 1-4). The result of this approach is that becoming a Marine Corps recruiter and
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performing well as one is career enhancing and thus desirable.
In visits to Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps recruiting stations, we observed that all three services
issue smartphones to their recruiters that they use to communicate with potential applicants (using
voice, e-mail, and texting) and they have laptops with wifi hotspot capability and printers enabled as
portable offices. All three services’ recruiters use social media to help prospect with what seemed
to be reasonably minimal restrictions.
2.4 Military Recruiting in the United Kingdom and Australia
As part of our research, we looked at how the Royal Navy and the Australian Defence Force conduct
recruiting. Similar to Stoker & Mehay (2011, p. 20), we found “Different recruiting models – both in
terms of organization and processes – are being used by AVF [All-Volunteer Force] nations.” In this
section, we describe these models to illustrate successful alternatives to the current U.S. military
recruiting model where, due to the similarities between the United States and these countries in
terms of language, history, culture, and a host of other societal factors, it is reasonable to assume
that these models are relevant and applicable to U.S. military recruiting.
2.4.1 Royal Navy Recruiting
Royal Navy recruiting is headquartered at Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Portsmouth under
Captain Naval Recruiting (CNR). CNR is responsible for “full-time” and reserve recruiting for the
Royal Navy and Royal Marines (RN/RM). CNR is responsible for both officer and ratings recruiting
in the Royal Navy and officer and “commando” recruiting in the Royal Marines.6
As described in Cameron (2014b, slide 3), CNR’s stated purpose is “To recruit high quality people
in sufficient numbers to maintain the operational capability of the Naval Service” with the following
objectives:
1. “To attract quality people (rather than simply delivering the ‘numbers’)” [emphasis in the
original].
2. “To generate high levels of emotional commitment from eligible candidates throughout the
recruitment process.”
3. “To excel as a modern recruiting organisation, in the fast-changing, complex and inter-connected
21st century world.”
In fiscal year 2014, CNR had a total recruiting target of roughly 4,500 new recruits in support of
a combined Royal Navy and Royal Marines force of approximately 33,000. For 2012/13, CNR
had recruiting expenditures of just over £33 million which included personnel costs, property costs,
marketing costs, and “other” costs (Cameron, 2014b). See the briefing overview of Royal Navy
recruiting in Section B.1, page 109, of Appendix B for additional detail.
For Royal Navy recruiting purposes, the United Kingdom is divided into four regions (Scotland and
Northern Ireland, northern England, southwestern England, and southeastern England and London).
6“Ratings” in the Royal Navy and “Commandos” in the Royal Marines are only very roughly equivalent to enlisted
ranks in the U.S. military. However, officers, ratings, and commandos comprise the totality of the forces.
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Figure 2.8: Location of RN/RM recruiting offices in the southeastern England and London region
(Vowles, 2014).
Royal Navy recruiting is centered around Armed Forces Career Offices (AFCOs), of which there
are seven in the southeastern England and London region (see Figure 2.8 or slide 4 of Vowles (2014)
in Section B.3). The AFCOs are staffed by full-time reservists who are retained on active duty to
conduct recruiting. CNR requires about 12,000 applicants in order to achieve the desired 4,500 new
recruits (Cameron, 2014a).
Royal Navy recruiting has recently been through a tough few years that includes:
• the downsizing of the force, referred to in the UK as making people “redundant;”
• significant organizational changes in which the operational arm of RN/RM recruiting was
moved to another organization;
• budget cut backs, including the government implementing the Efficiency and Reform Group
(ERG), a process that reviews and approves all funding requests;
• and decreasing propensity among youth to serve in the military (Cameron, 2014a).
As a result of a reorganization in the last year,7 Captain Naval Recruiting is now responsible for
Royal Navy recruiting plans and policy, under a chain of command that reports to the Second Sea
Lord & Chief of Naval Personnel, while the actual execution of recruiting falls under the Royal
Navy’s training command which reports to the Fleet Commander & Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.
As a result, CNR now says their organizational goal is to “transition from business management to
7See Royal Navy memorandum (Jones, 2014) in Section B.2, page 126 of Appendix B.
18
program and strategy management” (Cameron, 2014a).
The Royal Navy recruiting model differs from the U.S. Navy recruiting model in a number of
significant ways:
• As just described, under the new reorganization, CNR has responsibility for Royal Navy
recruiting policy but it is not responsible for execution. At first blush this seems to be an
unusual arrangement and one that a recruiting commander would not prefer. However, while
not initially in favor of the change, CNR relayed that it has had the benefit of freeing CNR up
from the day-to-day tactics, pressures and issues of running a large organization, allowing it
to concentrate on long-term strategy.
• Unlike U.S. military recruiting that is based on an active recruiting model, Royal Navy re-
cruiting is based on a passive recruiting model, meaning that recruiters staffing the AFCOs
do not actively solicit for potential recruits. Instead, the RN/RM recruiting model encourages
potential applicants to “call, click, or come in” via outreach and marketing and the AFCO
recruiters then provide the potential applicants with information and assist them as they work
their way through the RN/RM application and testing processes.
• The RN/RM recruiting system is focused on recruiting career sailors, to the extent that their
medical evaluation strives to ensure that the applicant does not have medical conditions that
will cause problems when they’re 55 years old. Furthermore, RN/RM recruiters expect ap-
plicants to choose the occupation they want to apply for, where the notion is that leaving the
choice entirely up to the applicant results in officers and ratings who are more likely to be
satisfied with their career and thus stay longer. Indeed, in recent years the Royal Navy has
had a first term (at the 4-1/2 year point) attrition rate of 25% and CRN says that is too big
(Cameron, 2014a).
• Because CNR no longer has active control over the RN/RM recruiters, and because the re-
cruiting model is a passive one requiring applicants to contact the RN/RM recruiting system,
CNR must focus on structuring a recruiting system that attracts potential recruits in the right
numbers and flows them through the screening system appropriately so that recruiting tar-
gets are met. CNR is in the process of taking a systematic systems engineering approach to
mapping the recruiting process, defining performance metrics, and then deriving strategy and
policy to manage the process in order to achieve their recruiting targets. See Section B.1 of
Appendix B for additional detail.
In structuring its recruiting processes, CNR is emphasizing customer relationship management
(CRM), where the idea is that RN/RM recruiting processes should be externally focused on the po-
tential recruit. For example, CRM means that the applicant tracking system and other computerized
information systems should not just be designed around the RN recruiting organization’s internal
process, but it should also (and more importantly) focus on what the applicant needs, desires, and
expects out of the recruiting process. Per CNR, the recruiting system should support any way that
the applicant wants to interact (“call-click-come in”) with the organization, the system should be
designed to keep nudging applicants through the recruitment process, and it should provide emo-
tional engagement to keep people in the process. CNR is working to expand CRM throughout the
entire recruiting and retention process (Cameron, 2014a).
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CNR is also emphasizing developing, promoting, and distributing marketing materials on social
media in order to advertise where the potential recruits have a presence (e.g., Vine, Vlogging). As
the CNR marketing manager said, “We need to message into their reality” (Colley, 2014). To do
this, in the process of developing traditional marketing materials for traditional media outlets, CNR
simultaneously ensures that the resulting materials are also compatible with new media.8
CNR’s three “marketing imperatives” are:
1. Meet recruiting targets by ensuring that marketing results in sufficient eligible contacts.
2. Execute a customer focused business that maximizes the customer value proposition; in the
offer, be sure to address “What’s in it for me?”
3. Demonstrate value, meaning return on investment, particularly for the ERG (Colley, 2013,
slide 5).
CNR’s marketing manager has responsibility for “tone of voice” across the entire enterprise, which
is important since candidates can interact with recruiting enterprise via the Internet, telephone, and
face-to-face modes. CNR feels that it is important for applicants to have a consistent experience and
get the same message from both the marketing side and the operations side of the organization. See
Royal Navy Marketing briefing in Section B.4, page 137, of Appendix B for additional detail.
2.4.2 Australian Defence Force Recruiting
The Australian Defence Force Recruiting (DFR) organization is headquartered in Canberra ACT.
DFR is a joint organization responsible for all military recruiting in support of the Royal Australian
Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Australian Army. The services set service-specific
standards and requirements, as well as recruiting targets, and DFR executes the recruiting mis-
sion, including screening applicants according to the services’ requirements: “DFR recruits the
right people in the right numbers at the right time for the ADF in order to build and sustain De-
fence capability” (O’Brien, 2014, slide 8). In fiscal year 2013, DFR had a total recruiting target
of approximately 8,300 new recruits in support of the three Australian services that in total have
approximately 53,000 personnel, a total which is projected to grow to 57,000 by 2015/16 (Larkin,
2014; O’Brien, 2014).
As shown in Figure 2.9, Australia is divided into four recruiting regions (Queensland in yellow, New
South Wales in light green, Victoria & Tasmania in blue, and South Australia & Western Australia
& the Northern Territory in dark green) and recruiting is conducted in 16 recruiting centers spread
throughout the country. The recruiting centers are staffed by 340 military personnel (232 full-time
and 108 part-time), 21 civil servants, and 400 contractor staff (Larkin, 2014). See the Australian
Defence Force Recruiting overview in Section C.2, page 152, of Appendix C for additional detail.
The Australian Defence Force recruiting model differs from the U.S. Navy recruiting model in a
number of significant ways:
• DFR is a joint service organization in which key DFR leadership positions rotate among the
8For example, when creating and shooting a 30-second television advertisement, CNR also ensures that there are short
6-second vignettes compatible with Vine.
20
Figure 2.9: Australian DFR regional recruiting structure (Larkin, 2014).
three services and the military personnel staffing the headquarters and recruiting centers are
drawn from all three services. Within the ADF, the individual services establish recruitment
standards, run the officer selection boards, and grant waivers, so the individual services still
control the recruiting standards for their services.
• As shown in Figure 2.10, DFR is a combined public-private organization, where DFR has
entered into a 10-year contract with Manpower Group, a company that specializes in recruit-
ing. In this partnership, particularly in the recruiting stations, active duty DFR personnel are
the “face” of recruiting while Manpower Group provides the “behind the scenes” expertise
and continuity. For example, at the recruiting centers, military personnel brief and interview
applicants, discusses service options and positions with the applicants, and conduct outreach
events. Manpower Group acquires and manages the facilities, runs the IT/MIS system, man-
ages marketing, runs the call center and manages applicants in the pipeline, etc. Organiza-
tionally, each DFR active duty manager is paired with a civilian Manpower Group counterpart
and they work together as a combined team, each with specific duties and responsibilities for
some part of the operation.
• As with the Royal Navy, the DFR is based on a passive recruiting model in the sense that they
do advertising and outreach and then expect applicants to come in to apply and process for
entrance into the military. In fact, DFR recruiting centers are more akin to a U.S. MEPS in the
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Figure 2.10: DFR’s organizational structure and responsibilities (Larkin, 2014).
sense that the center is mainly for processing applicants. Furthermore, DFR station personnel
are not recruiters in the U.S. sense. Mainly they process applicants as they come into the
station and they do a bit of outreach to the local community (e.g., going to high schools).
• Also as with with Royal Navy, DFR has a strong focus on “customer care” (i.e., customer re-
lationship management). As part of this, ADF intends to transition to “NextGen” MIS system
in the next three years which will provide an improved “On-line Application Tool (OLAT)”
to facilitate applicants being able to at least begin application process on-line, improved can-
didate tracking and management, and an ability for applicants to interact with system (e.g.,
upload documents), query system, communicate with DFR, etc (McKerrow & Rudzki, 2014).
See the DFR IT briefing in Section C.3.
• Finally, in addition to a session with DFR personnel to select an occupation, candidates have
an interview session with a DFR military interviewer which is much like a job interview
where they have to convince the interviewer why they want to join the ADF. And, prior to
that interview, each candidate meets with a psychologist to ensure they are mentally prepared
and psychologically suitable for the military.
DFR joint service recruiting offers a number of benefits. For example, there are the obvious effi-
ciency gains from operating one recruiting center per location rather than three. But there are other
benefits for applicants, such as the fact that after taking their psychometric test (the equivalent of
our ASVAB) candidates are shown all of the jobs they are qualified for across all three services.
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While it is up to the candidates to select which service and occupation they are interested in, pre-
cisely because the DFR is joint each applicant can make a fully-informed decision about choice of
service and occupation, including perhaps making trade-offs if their first choice occupation is filled
in a given service, the entry date for a given service/occupation pair too far off, etc.
The public-private DFR organization is particularly innovative. For example, under their contract
Manpower Group and their management personnel have financial incentives for achieving specific
recruiting targets. Hence, just as with commercial organizations, DFR can use monetary goals
to motivate Manpower Group to meet specific recruiting targets and metrics (e.g., number of ap-
plicants, time in the pipeline).9 However, standards are set by the services and final approval of
applicants is controlled by the military side of the DFR, so there is a check in the system to maintain
recruit quality. For example, all applicants meet with an active duty DFR interviewer who makes a
final assessment of their fitness and suitability for military service.10
Because roughly half of DFR is a commercial entity, this allows the organization to use commercial
resources when they are most appropriate and effective while also using military resources where
they are most appropriate and effective. Thus, for example, senior Manpower Group managers, who
bring significant recruiting expertise to bear from the civilian world, are monetarily incentivized to
meet recruiting targets. Similarly, Manpower Group is responsible for acquiring and providing the
recruiting center infrastructure, which they can do with commercial best practices, and they are
responsible for the IT infrastructure, where they can acquire the necessary hardware and personnel
on the commercial market. This allows DFR to more agilely adapt to the latest in commercial
technology where, for example, they now have a “slim version” of their current OLAT that works
on smartphones and a new mobile-friendly recruiting website (which DFR reports is starting to get
a good amount of traffic). See the Australian Defence Force Recruiting overview in Section C.2,
page 152, and the DFR IT briefing in Section C.3, page 163, in Appendix C for additional detail.
2.5 Summary
This chapter described the current recruiting processes of multiple military organizations: the U.S.
Navy, the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps, as well as the Royal Navy and the
Australian Defence Force. The U.S. military services all use essentially the same active recruiting
model in which active duty military personnel serve as recruiters, actively soliciting and selling the
military to a core market of 17–24 year old potential recruits.
In the United States, there are no corporate equivalents to the military recruiting approach. As
Chapter 3 discusses, corporate recruiting is almost exclusively focused on “white collar” recruiting
with civilian recruiters seeking out individual applicants for very specific positions. There are, of
course, those corporations with significant personnel requirements, but they operate under recruiting
models more akin to the Royal Navy and ADF: broad advertising to generate inquiries from which
9There is a built-in contractual lower bound so that if recruiting targets end up too low, for whatever operational or
political reason out of Manpower Group’s control, the company is financially protected. This was a lesson learned from
the previous contract where the contractor was negatively affected due to external factors out of the company’s control.
10The interviewer can even override the psychologist’s evaluation, though this is only rarely done.
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human resources then screens the applicants. There is simply no civilian analog that operates on the
scale of the U.S. military that annually recruits over 150 thousand high school graduates.
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CHAPTER 3:
Description of Generations Y, Z, and Alpha
In this chapter, we describe the various generational cohorts as discussed in the social science
and popular literature, with an emphasis on the Millennial and post-Millennial generations, includ-
ing their predicted propensity to serve, recommended methods for effectively communicating with
them, and theories regarding recruitment methods. In so doing, to the extent possible, we focus on
those generational attributes and experiences that are most relevant to military recruiting.
Now, while the generational descriptions do not characterize all individuals in a cohort, the cohort
does have a common set of experiences in terms of major world events. For example, a recent
report by the Council on Economic Advisors notes, “The Millennial generation has taken part in
many important transformations: from shifting ways of communicating and using technology, to
changes in parenting practices, educational and career choices, and shifts in homeownership and
family life” (The Council of Economic Advisors, 2014). As the cartoon in Figure 3.1 suggests,
what is important is whether these transformations have resulted in future generations that will be
disconnected from how the military currently conducts recruiting.
3.1 Defining and Labeling the Generations
We begin by defining the various generations of interest – Generations Y, Z, and Alpha – which in
this report we generally refer to in the aggregate as the ‘Millennial and post-Millennial generations.’
• Generation Y consists of those born between 1981 and 2000. Often referred to as the Millen-
nial generation, and sometimes the Boomerang or Peter Pan generation, it is both the largest
and most ethnically and racially diverse generation in the history of the United States (En-
der et al., 2013; Strauss et al., 2006). Generation Y has grown up with the Internet and an
increasingly globally connected world.
• Generation Z consists of those individuals born between 2000-2012 or 1995-2010 depending
on the source (Anatole, 2013; Ender et al., 2013; McCrindle, 2013). Also referred to as the
iGeneration (or Generation I), the Homeland Generation, and the New Silent Generation, it is
expected to be smaller than the Millennial generation. For this generation, Google has always
existed: Google.com was registered as a domain name in 1997. In a similar vein, they were
only two years old when USB flash drives came on the market. Generation Z are the first
‘digital natives.’
• Generation Alpha is one name for the generation that follows Generation Z, though the name
is not yet widely used or recognized. If we set the beginning year of this generation at 2012,
they will have always known smartphones, tablet computers, streaming video, and whatever
new electronic and communications advances that may come to market in the next few years.
Now, in addition to these generations having a variety of monikers in the United States, they are
referred to by other names in other countries. For example, Gill (2005, p. 6) notes:
In the United States there are numerous written reports that identify the new ‘Millennial
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Figure 3.1: A metaphor for how future generations may be disconnected from current military
recruiting practices?
Generation’ by different names, and offer chronological parameters for this population.
Canada prefers to use the term ‘Echo Generation’; while Australia refers to this popu-
lation of young adults as ‘Generation Y’; and the United Kingdom has christened them
‘Newmils’, ‘Generation Y’, and sometimes, to a lesser extent, ‘Thatcher’s Children.’
To put the Millennial and post-Millennial generations in context, as described in Buahene & Kovary
(2003, pp. 6-7), their forebears are the following generations:
• Traditionalist Generation which consists of those born between 1922 and 1945. Also com-
monly referred to as The Silent Generation, World War II and the great depression had a
significant impact on this generation’s values and opinions. Characteristics of this generation
include respect for authority and adherence to the rules.
• Baby Boomer Generation which consists of those born between 1946 and 1964. This gener-
ation is sometimes divided into those born in the 1940’s and early 50’s – who actively partic-
ipated in the events of the 1960’s – and those born in the mid 1950’s and early 60’s who were
not old enough to directly experience those events. Baby Boomers are often characterized as
self-centered and self-indulgent.
• Generation X which consists of those born between 1965 and 1980. Sometimes referred
to as Baby Busters, Generation X has been called the “lost” generation, where divorce and
single parenting were more widespread than in past generations, and the notion of the latchkey
child in dual income families became common. In the 1980s and 1990s, Generation X was
often characterized as lazy and as slackers who lacked the hard work and dedication of the
preceding generations.
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Table 3.1: Major life-defining events for the Traditionalist, Baby Boomer, Generation X, and Mil-
lennial generations. Source: Buahene & Kovary (2003, p. 9).
Traditionalist (1922-1945) Baby Boomer (1946-1964)
• The Great Depression • Civil Rights Movement
• Pearl Harbor • Cuban Missile Crisis
• World War II • Vietnam War
• D-Day • Assassination of JFK and MLK
• Rise of Communism • The Cold War
• Korean War • Neil Armstrong lands on the Moon
• Golden Age of Radio • Woodstock – Free Love
• Rise of the Silver Screen • TV becomes dominant medium
Generation X (1965-1980) Generation Y (1981-2000)
• Women’s Liberation movement • Oklahoma City bombing
• AIDS • Death of Princess Diana
• Challenger disaster • Columbine massacre
• Fall of the Berlin Wall • Clinton-Lewinsky scandal
• Operation Desert Storm I • 9/11 attacks
• Rodney King and LA riots • War on Terror (Iraq & Afghanistan)
• First personal computers • Rise of the digital age (Internet, etc.)
Table 3.1, adapted from Buahene & Kovary (2003, p. 9), summarizes some of the major life events
for the Traditionalist, Baby Boomer, Generation X, and Millennial generations.
3.2 Generation Y, Z, and Alpha Characteristics
For each of these generations, demographers, social scientists, and marketers have derived broad
generational descriptions and characteristics. These generational descriptions depict a stereotypical
individual from a cohort of individuals born during a window in time. This might be thought of
as a description of the average individual from that particular cohort. However, it is important
to note that the descriptions provide little insight into how two individuals drawn from the same
generational cohort might differ in terms of these characteristics, including propensity to serve.
Thus, while useful for gaining insights into the expected behavior of a cohort, the generational
descriptions apply to varying degrees to individuals from that cohort.
For example, while Generation Y is the largest and most ethnically and racially diverse generation
in U.S. history, Strauss et al. (2006) associates the following traits with this generation: special,
sheltered, confident, team-oriented, achieving, pressured, and conventional. Ender et al. (2013)
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describes the Millennials as being motivated to military service for personal reasons such as edu-
cational opportunities or other benefits that they believe will provide them a personal competitive
advantage in the future. Parents, education, the state of the economy, technology, and the media all
influence Millennials decision making (Hyler, 2013).
Based on four consecutive years of study, The 2014 Millennial Impact Report (Feldman et al., 2014)
finds that Millennials:
• Engage with causes to help other people, not institutions.
• Support issues rather than organizations.
• Prefer to perform smaller actions before fully committing to a cause.
• Are influenced by the decisions and behaviors of their peers.
• Treat all their assets (time, money, network, etc.) as having equal value.
• Need to experience an organization’s work without having to be on site.
See Gill (2005, pp. 8-9) for further descriptive information about Millennials (as well as the Baby
Boom generation and Generation X). Also, for additional information about Millennials from an
Australian defense perspective, see “Understanding Millennials – A GPY&R Perspective” in Sec-
tion C.4 of Appendix C.
Turning now to Generation Z, Anatole (2013) finds that “there is evidence to suggest that their
influence, fueled by an innate and constant connection to the world around them, will outstrip their
size.” McCrindle (2013) says,
Gen Z is part of a generation that is global, social, visual and technological. They are
the most connected, educated and sophisticated generation ever. They are the up-agers,
with influence beyond their years. They are the tweens, the teens, the youth and young
adults of our global society. They are the early adopters, the brand influencers, the
social media drivers, the pop-culture leaders.
The following traits are associated with Generation Z (Ender et al., 2013):
• Fiscally conservative, self-reliant
• Indifferent to technology, but tech savvy
• Oriented to needs of others
• Connected to peers and knowledge
• Flexible, unconventional, realists
• Look for alternatives to costly colleges
• Not as loyal to companies
Generation Z’s social media habits seem to be varying from the Millennial generations’. As reported
in The Sydney Morning Herald:
In the US, according to surveys, 25 per cent of 13- to 17-year-olds have quit the me-
galithic media site this year alone. In Australia, David Seedhouse, founder of the Val-
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ues Exchange (VX), a Gen Z forum with more than 100,000 registered users, estimates
that “between half and two-thirds of them are not interested in Facebook. They’re very
safety conscious, very protective of each other and themselves. And they’re very con-
cerned about surveillance. ‘It’s our data, it’s not your data’ – they’re very strong on
that” (Hooton, 2014)
Generation Z is only now maturing and beginning to enter the work force. If their forecasted char-
acteristics actually manifest, they would seem primed with a high propensity to serve.
Finally, Generation Alpha is a term currently just coming into usage to refer to those born from
the end of Generation Z forward. This generation is being born as of the writing of this report,
with its oldest members at age two or four depending on where the boundary line of Generation Z
is drawn. Not surprisingly, this generation is expected to be extremely proficient and comfortable
with technology and a connected world, but it will take some time for the other characteristics of
the generation to begin to be observed.
3.2.1 Comparing Millennials to Previous Generations
As described in Buahene & Kovary (2003, p. 10), Table 3.2 compares the attitudes and values of the
Millennial generation against the Traditionalist, Baby Boomer, Generation X generations. Similarly,
Table 3.3 compares the characteristics and skills of the Millennial generation against the previous
three generations (Buahene & Kovary, 2003, p. 11).
The Defense Acquisition University sought to compare the motivation of Millennials to Generation
X and the Baby Boomers. They asked three questions about Generation Y in terms of “five motiva-
tional factors”: responsibilities, compensation, work environment, advancement potential, and free
time.
• Does Generation Y assign different levels of importance to the five motivational factors than
Generation X and Baby Boomers?
• Does Generation Y assign different levels of happiness to the five motivational factors than
Generation X and Baby Boomers; and which of these factors is ranked the highest across
generations?
• Does Generation Y’s average attribute utility of the five motivational factors differ from Gen-
eration X and Baby Boomers?
The study concluded that Millennials view responsibilities and compensation as less important than
either Generation X or the Baby Boomers. Millennials ranked advancement potential and free time
higher than either Generation X or the Baby Boomers, though this most likely can be attributed to
the stage of life that most Millennials are in Barford & Hester (2011). Overall Millennials ranked
compensation as the highest motivational factor and responsibility the lowest. Advancement poten-
tial and free time are important considerations as well. This points to the desire Millennials have to
maintain a work-life balance (Barford & Hester, 2011).
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Table 3.2: Attitudes and values of the Millennial generation versus the Traditionalist, Baby Boomer,
Generation X generations. Source: Buahene & Kovary (2003, p. 10).
Traditionalist (1922-1945) Baby Boomer (1946-1964)
• Loyalty • Optimism
• Respect for authority • Involvement
• Dedication and sacrifice • Team orientation
• Patience • Personal growth & gratification
• Conformity • Youthfulness
• Honor • Equality
Generation X (1965-1980) Generation Y (1981-2000)
• Independence & self-reliance • Confidence
• Pragmatism • Diversity
• Skepticism • Civic duty
• Informality • Respect for authority
• Balance • Dedication
• Collaboration • Optimism
3.2.2 Propensity to Service & Communication Methods
Almost half of the Millennial employees surveyed for The 2014 Millennium Project Report indi-
cated they enjoyed taking part in volunteer activities for nonprofits and Millennials want to work for
companies that benefit the public good (Feldman et al., 2014). If the military can motivate Millen-
nials to view military service as a cause that benefits the public good then the Millennial generation
seems primed for service to the nation. The shaping of this perception must take into account the
sources of information that Millennials typically seek and place value on.
Millennials rely on relationships for information about future employers, with the top three sources
being a company’s website, a Google Search, and word of mouth (Feldman et al., 2014). As Walsh
(2010, p. 4) says,
Close friends, family members, key developmental influencers, and social network
friends and groups make up the baseline of trusted influencers for generation Y and
I. Therefore, any effective methods for making an impact on the beliefs and perceptions
of this generation cannot just start from the outside – methods must include a significant
‘inside-out’ approach among these key groups.
Thus, as the cartoon in Figure 3.2 suggests, marketing to Millennials is more of a challenge because
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Table 3.3: Characteristics and skills of the Millennial generation versus the Traditionalist, Baby
Boomer, Generation X generations. Source: Buahene & Kovary (2003, p. 11).
Traditionalist (1922-1945) Baby Boomer (1946-1964)
• Compliant • Success oriented
• Stable • Team player
• Detail oriented • Relationship focused
• Hard working • Eager to add value
• Dedicated • Participative management style
Generation X (1965-1980) Generation Y (1981-2000)
• Techno-literate & self-reliant • Technologically savvy
• Flexible & adaptable • Oriented to collective action
• Creative • Self-reliant
• Independent • Tolerant of differences
• Multi-tasker • Eager for responsibility
• Results driven • Innovative
mass-marketing is not sufficient.
Millennials want to trust their employers and take part in organizations that are honest and support
a worthy cause. They first check what the company says that it does, then see what evidence the
web provides that the company follows its own mission and vision, then verify if possible with first
person interviews. Organizations that wish to attract Millennials must be aware of their reputation
as portrayed on the internet in addition to working to ensure that current and past members relate
positive experiences from their time with the organization. Millennials will not simply take the or-
ganization’s description of itself at face value, but will go to the data readily available on the Internet
to do their own fact checking and arrive at their own conclusions, which they will then bounce off
first person observational data from individuals who they either know or have met through the web.
Drago (2006) points to the military’s challenge in recruiting Millennials, who are interested in
career advancement opportunities, when they are not attracted to an offer to start at the bottom of
a structured hierarchical organization with low pay – that is not tied to performance. In particular,
college bound Millennials, who see bright futures on the horizon, are not likely to detour into an
organization that does not allow for rapid advancement based on performance and talent – that also
provides fixed pay scales. Drago concludes that the propensity to serve for the Millennial generation
is less than the previous generations, at least for those who are potentially college bound. He also
reinforces the observation that Millennials and their parents have less first hand exposure to the
military than previous generations. This highlights the need for deliberate selection of those service
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Figure 3.2: Because Millennials are commercially and technologically savvy, traditional marketing
approaches are less effective.
members assigned to recruiting billets.
Millennials are the most connected generation to date, more likely to go to the web for information
as well as to broadcast their experiences through the web or social media (Fromm & Garton, 2013).
They rely on the web for information prior to investing the time to go to a brick and mortar establish-
ment. The information garnered from the web is not likely to simply be a menu for a restaurant, but
also a check on first person accounts from other Millennials through websites dedicated to online
reviews. Brands seeking to market to Millennials must not only provide a positive user experience
for those visiting their own website, but must manage their perception on a variety of social me-
dia sites where reviews are maintained and updated in near real time. This requires ensuring that
customers who visit brick and mortar facilities leave with a positive experience and requires a mar-
keting team that stays in front of the trends in social media, viewing these online broadcasts as a
form of customer feedback. The main difference is that these customer feedback items are public
and persistent. Millennials require brands that respond to their needs and make adjustments to their
policies to satisfy them as customers or they find other brands.
This creates unique challenges for the military services. As Walsh (2010, p. 4) says,
Younger generations are connected to the ‘information environment’ in dramatically
different ways than past generations and in response the Army’s recruiting efforts must
recognize and adapt to these changes in order to be successful in the future. Generation
Y and I composed of 15-24 year olds use of social media for ‘information-mining’ and
decision-making in ways that are a vast departure from previous generational norms
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and further complicates the current USAREC recruiting efforts.
Thus, while recruiting stations serve as a brick and mortar facility staffed with knowledgable ex-
perts, prior to the Millennial applicant coming in to the recruiting station, they will likely visit the
services’ site, Google the service, read reviews from other recruits, and only then invest the time to
come to the recruiting station. Following the visit, they are likely to publish their experience online,
rating how they were treated, potentially even calling out the particular recruiter by name. How
the service and recruiting station commanders manage this aspect of their storefront will influence
future Millennials decision on whether to bother coming to the recruiting station or not.
3.3 Recruiting Millennials and the Civilian Sector
In general, many of the recruiting processes in the civilian sector are not dramatically different from
what they were a decade or two ago. In fact, in a 2013 international survey of companies, Randstad
(2013, p. 17) found that “recruitment companies and employee referrals were the most widely-used
resources for finding talent. Company websites, print advertising and job boards were also used
frequently.”
What is different are the recruiting practices, where advertising and application processes that used
to be largely paper- and mail-based have now been virtualized, having been replaced by on-line
applications and transmission via the Internet instead of the postal mail. Similarly, where commu-
nication used to be largely via the telephone, communication modes now reflect the digital age:
virtual interviews; e-mail, text, and chat discussions; and the use of social media by both companies
and applicants to advertise, identify opportunities, and otherwise interact.
One particular practice that has dramatically changed in the digital age is the active recruitment for
specific positions, often of individuals who themselves are not actively looking to change jobs. In
the past, such recruitment would have been a very labor intensive effort with a recruiter actively
working contacts and personal networks, usually by telephone. Today, it is much more focused on
exploiting on-line information, often from professional and social communities. For example, in a
2013 survey of 651 human resources professionals, the Society for Human Resource Management
(2013, p. 2) found that “More than three-quarters (77%) of organizations reported using social
networking sites to recruit potential job candidates, an increase from 56% in 2011 and 34% in
2008.”
Furthermore, The Economist (2014, p. 51) recently reported that,
Recruiters are LinkedIn’s main source of revenue. They pay for licenses to trawl for
likely job candidates and to e-mail them about vacancies, as well as for placing ad-
vertisements on the site. This business–called “talent solutions”–accounts for about
three-fifths of sales. It allows recruiters to be more precise about the groups to search
in order to find more people to hire–people who attended certain universities, say. Ra-
jesh Ahuja, the senior recruiter in Europe and Asia at Infosys, and Indian software
company, focused on a recent effort to hire 200 MBA students on graduates of several
hundred colleges.
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Figure 3.3: Ranking of innovative recruitment methods from 2013 Randstad survey of companies.
Source: Randstad (2013, p. 19).
Indeed, in a 2013 Randstad international survey of companies, social and professional network re-
cruiting were ranked highest of all “innovative recruitment methods” (Randstad, 2013). See Figure
3.3. They say, “For those respondents that used social networking sites, 48% claimed they were
successful for recruiting and used them as their channel when looking for staff-level employees or
management candidates” (Randstad, 2013, p. 7).
A recent white paper by Oracle (2012, p. 2) says that, as a strategic initiative, social recruiting has
the following benefits:
• Find hard-to-reach candidates. When competition for talent is fierce, identifying the best
can be challenging. Social networking offers the ability to reach out to passive or hard-to-find
candidates that likely could not be reached using other sources.
• Reach higher-quality candidates. Individuals who frequently use social networks tend to
be “early adopters” of innovation and also tend to be more technically savvy. These are the
traits many companies look for in potential candidates. Social networks offer a fast way to
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connect with these individuals.
• Increase ROI. You can dramatically reduce sourcing costs and increase ROI through social
networks. Posting and sharing job openings through Facebook or LinkedIn is more likely to
deliver results than a single description on a job board, so the potential value far exceeds the
cost.
• Be the employer of choice. When your company establishes an online presence, you send a
positive message out to potential candidates that your company is connected and understands
how to communicate with them. Being the employer of choice means candidates want to
work for you and spread that message across social networks, magnifying your brand and
message.”
Now, the Oracle white paper suggests the use of social media is easier and more efficient than it
actually may be. What is becoming apparent to recruiters and marketers is that users of social
media want it to be just that – social. Gallup (2014, p. 3) concludes,
Customer engagement drives social engagement – the degree to which consumers will
work for or against an organization within their social networks – not the other way
around. And any effort to engage customers must take place through both offline and
online channels, as Gallup has consistently found that customer engagement is influ-
enced in large part by how well a company aligns all of its touch points. Social media
do not exist in a vacuum, and consumers rarely interact with companies through these
channels alone.
Similarly, Singh (2014) says,
...recruiting via social media is all about engagement. ... What engages people are
one-on-one interactions, the type they have with friends and family, which also means
they have some kind of an emotional connection. That is difficult, or near impossible to
do, when trying to connect with large numbers of people through a typical social media
site as corporate marketing departments like to do. The same is true for recruiters. You
can only have a real connection with a very small number of people.
Recruiting via social media also may not be without risk. The Society for Human Resource Man-
agement (2013, p. 2) found that “About one-half of organizations are concerned with legal risks
or discovering information about protected characteristics (e.g., age, race, gender, religious affili-
ation) (52%) or do not have enough HR staff time to use this recruiting method (48%). One out
of four (26%) cite questions about the accuracy of the information on social networking websites.
Government organizations are more likely than nonprofit organizations to have concerns about legal
risks/discovering information about protected characteristics.”
As discussed in Section 3.2, the Millennial and post-Millennial generations are technologically
savvy and marketing skeptics. Furthermore, the 2014 Millennial Project Report (Feldman et al.,
2014) identifies the following top five factors that Millennials consider when applying for a job:
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• What the company specifically does, sells or produces
• The company’s work culture
• The company’s office environment
• The company’s diversity and HR awards
Thus, when it comes to recruiting materials and practices, Employment Office (2014, p. 3) argues in
a section titled “Keep it Real” that companies must go beyond historical recruiting and advertising
practices:
Arguably one of the most important aspects of recruiting to Gen Y’s and Z’s with social
media is keeping all contact and advertising as authentic as possible. With Gen Y
growing up immersed in marketing and Gen Z displaying traits of being genuinely
distrustful of traditional advertising methods, making sure your recruitment strategy
‘keeps it real’ is essential.
Consistent with this, Gallup says corporate social media sites for the Millennial and post-Millennial
generations – whether for recruiting or any other purpose – need to be:
• Authentic. Social media sites are highly personal and conversational. And, as Gallup finds,
consumers who use these sites do not want to hear sales pitches. They are more likely to listen
and respond to companies that seem genuine and personable. They want to interact with a
human, not a brand. Companies should back away from the hard sell and focus on creating
more of an open dialogue with consumers.
• Responsive. The social media world is 24/7, and consumers expect timely responses – even
on nights and weekends. Companies must be available to answer questions and reply to
complaints and criticisms. Ignoring negative feedback can do even more damage to a brand’s
reputation. Instead, companies need to actively listen to what their customers are saying and
respond accordingly. If mistakes were made, they must own up to them and take responsibility.
• Compelling. Content is everywhere, and consumers have the ability to pick and choose what
they like. Companies have to create compelling, interesting content that appeals to busy, picky
social media users. This content should be original to the company and not related to sales
or marketing. Consumers need a reason to visit and interact with a company’s social media
site and to keep coming back to it (Gallup, 2014, p. 4).
Now, until recently, social media-based recruiting was used in the civilian sector mainly for find-
ing and filling white collar jobs, and within those the most hard-to-fill jobs. As shown in Figure
3.4, the Society for Human Resource Management (2013, p. 3) reports, “Nonmanagement salaried
(87%) and management (e.g., directors, managers) (80%) positions are the most commonly tar-
geted job levels. About one-half (48%) of organizations target nonmanagement hourly employees,
and 41% target executive/upper management positions (e.g., CEO, CFO).” However, that trend may
be changing. As reported in The Economist (2014, p. 53):
Perhaps most significant, LinkedIn has started to feel its way beyond professionals.
Since early June [2014] the number of jobs on its site has jumped from 350,000 to
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Figure 3.4: The most commonly targeted job levels by the civilian sector using social media: “Has
your organization ever used social networking websites to recruit potential job candidates, or does
your organization plan to do so in the future?” Source: Society for Human Resource Management
(2013, p. 8).
1m. As well as openings for software engineers at IBM can be found jobs as delivery
drivers for Pizza Hut or on the tills at Home Depot–which until now no one would have
expected to find there. ... The idea is being tested in America so far. But if delivery
drivers and checkout clerks start to look for and find jobs on the site, LinkedIn will
have taken a step towards becoming a much broader job shop.
In addition to the increasing use of social and professional networking media, a recent trend seems
to be improving applicant assessment and tracking systems to better align with Millennial expecta-
tions. As Employment Office (2014, p. 3) describe, Millennials want to “Have a smooth candidate
experience. They’ve been born with Internet in their mouths. You will lose them if an assessment
process is too long-winded and does not make sense to them.” The key words here are improving the
candidate’s experience when they interact with the organization. Part of this can be accomplished by
making the applicant tracking system – typically thought of as an internal recruiter tool – also work
for the applicant where, from the perspective of the company, the goal is candidate engagement. Per
Wheeler (2014):
Recruiting is finally moving away from transactional thinking and beginning to under-
stand how to better connect and engage with relevant candidates. ... The holy grail is to
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get candidates engaged in conversations and activities that will get them involved with
your firm, a recruiter, or other employees. This improves their experience and makes
them want to come back. The better this is done, the “stickier” the candidate and the
more likely h/she is to say yes to an interview or offer.
3.4 Summary
The Millennial generation, Generation Y, has been studied and is in the workforce. The post-
Millennial generations, Generation Z and Generation Alpha (or I), have yet to be fully defined.
The Millennial generation differs from previous generations in its motivations, modes of commu-
nications, and influencers. Broadly speaking, Millennials want to be part of something bigger than
themselves, care less about responsibility than previous generations, and value free time and work-
life balance than previous generations. Millennials communicate through the online world and
social media. They are influenced heavily by their parents, information from online websites, and
from first person accounts from peers.
The Millennial generation’s need to be part of something larger than themselves, should benefit
military recruiting efforts to the extent that the military can cast the service as a noble endeavor. The
Millennial generation’s use of multiple sources to shape their view of the world will create a need
for the military to be conscious of its web presence and the perceptions of it on social media sites
frequented by Millennials. This generation will have less first person exposure to friends or family
that served in the military, so the selection and training of recruiters will become more important.
The Millennial generation will hold the services to their stated values and when they see evidence
that the services are not living up to these expectations they will expect leadership to remedy the
situation. This generation will be loyal to the extent that they perceive the military is loyal to them,
but will not tolerate a one-way relationship.
If Millennials who join the military need to be in a position that advances their personal situation,
this may require the military to consider adjusting the way promotion is handled in the current
hierarchical system. That is, in order to attract Millennials the services will need to create an envi-
ronment where this generation perceives that its talents and creativity will be rewarded. Similarly,
if the current system is perceived as providing equal pay for unequal performance, it will create
friction with many from this generation, and that may result in a drag on recruiting.
In order to avoid direct competition with colleges for recruitment of Millennials, the services will
need to revalidate the skill requirements for service members. Those with the will to serve, but
marginal skills under the current system, should become prime candidates for service. This popu-
lation will not be targeted by colleges and could potentially be trained to meet minimum standards
prior to entering the production pipeline. This would require an additional investment on the front




There’s a way to do it better—find it.
Thomas A. Edison (1847-1931)
Over the years, a number of recruiting organization, system, and process improvements have been
proposed and some implemented. We conducted an extensive review of the published literature and
the proposed improvements include:
• Employing civilian recruiters;
• Conducting joint recruiting;
• Improving recruiter selection, screening and/or training; and,
• Leveraging the Internet and social media.
In this chapter, we describe the proposed potential improvements as described in the literature,
as well as any other information or evidence that we have gleaned about whether any of these
proposed improvements have been shown to be effective. Following this, in Chapter 5 we describe
past recruiting experiments that were conducted to evaluate some of these proposed improvements.
4.1 Employing Civilian Recruiters
The use of civilian recruiters, either to augment military recruiters or to replace them, has been
debated for years in the recruiting community as well as in the literature. For example, Worthington
et al. (2000, p. 37) say,
Our research has shown that hiring civilians to recruit military personnel is a con-
tentious issue with strong opinions on both sides. Those against feel that “farming
out” our toughest mission admits defeat and would do little to attract youth. Early
results of outsourcing, however, do not show this to be the case. The Army Reserve
recently utilized the contract firms of RCI [Resource Consultants Inc.] and MPRI [Mil-
itary Professional Resources Inc.] to recruit medical personnel and general enlisted
for the Army Reserve. They have focused their efforts in the south and midwest with a
total of around 85 contracted civilian (most former military) recruiters. Their results to
date have been the same or better as military recruiters, while achieving market pene-
tration in new and untapped areas. While it is doubtful that this could be replicated on
a national level, it shows that this approach can be successful in well-defined markets.
They go on to say,
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We recommend that outsourcing be attempted, on a test basis, for areas with high con-
centrations of college students such as the northeast. A person with a strong recruiting
background would be hired to work for the local recruiting district. This “college
prospector” would answer directly to the recruiting district commanding officer. Our
feeling is that this highly focused recruiter would have the advantages of a nonthreat-
ening campus presence, better rapport with local officials, and a full set of tools for
getting the message out to this highly educated sector (p. 38).
The Army did subsequently test civilian recruiters from 2002 to 2007. As reported via the Army
News Service, in February 2002 “the Army awarded two civilian companies contracts totaling
$172.4 million to hire and manage recruiters for 10 different areas across the nation. ... Neither
the companies nor the recruiters they’re hiring are strangers to the military. Both companies – Mil-
itary Professional Resources Inc. and Resource Consultants Inc. – are located in Virginia and have
been recruiting for the Army reserve components since 1999” (Triggs, 2002).
In fact, the Army tried a number of approaches using civilian recruiters, including a recruiting
comparativeness experiment that assessed the effectiveness of civilian recruiters versus active duty
recruiters, integrating civilian recruiters in with active duty recruiting, and providing civilian office
staff to support active duty recruiters in order to free recruiters up to focus on recruiting. Ultimately,
these efforts were discontinued due to cost (Nelson, 2014).
More recently, in March 2012, the British Army outsourced its recruiting operations to a civilian
contractor (Capita) under a 10-year contract (Capita, 2012). As Capita says on its website, “While
the Army retains ownership of recruitment policy, entry criteria and assessment standards, Capita
will deliver the entire process for the attraction and recruitment of soldiers and officers to the Reg-
ular and Territorial Army.” The goal is to transform British Army recruiting into a fully digitized
operation with one major hub and career centers. However, a year after the transition, British Army
recruitment numbers were significantly down (Farmer, 2013) and, in response, the British Army
reintroduced uniformed Army personnel back into the recruiting system (Cameron, 2014a).
As described in Section 2.4.2, the Australian Defence Force has successfully outsourced some of
its recruiting operations to a civilian contractor (Manpower Group). In particular, Manpower Group
is responsible for much of the recruiting infrastructure, including recruiting offices, facilities, and
vehicles; the IT infrastructure; marketing; recruit care, including pipeline management and analysis
and reporting (O’Brien, 2014). In these roles, they perform much like the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers in terms of acquiring, furbishing, and maintaining recruiting infrastructure (such as recruiting
stations) and MEPCOM in terms of providing medical and psychological assessments of applicants.
Most critically, the Manpower Group is contractually responsible for ensuring recruiting targets are
met and, in this role, they bring civilian recruiting expertise to bear in support of the Defence Force
Recruiting (DFR) organization. However, they function in a supporting role to the military DFR
personnel who perform all applicant quality control functions and serve as the uniformed “face” of
Australian military recruiting to applicants.
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Returning to the original goal of this research, nothing in the literature or in the interviews we con-
ducted suggests that employing civilian recruiters as part of the existing U.S. military recruiting
business model is a more effective strategy for recruiting the Millennial and post-Millennial genera-
tions. In fact, in all of our meetings with U.S. military recruiters, the services’ recruiting commands,
and with the Royal Navy and the Australian Defence Force, we asked whether civilians could or
should conduct recruiting in place of uniformed personnel. Without exception, everyone we talked
to said that it is important for applicants to interact with uniformed personnel and that civilians
simply couldn’t perform as effectively, at least in terms of representing the military.
Of course, the U.S. Army’s experiments with civilian recruiters is something of a counterpoint to
this, where there the civilian recruiters performed as effectively in terms of making their recruiting
targets, but they were more costly. It is also important to note that the civilian recruiters were
comprised of retired former military recruiters, so even if civilian replacements were cost effective,
it seems that switching to an all-civilian recruiting force would be unsustainable in the sense that
doing so would eliminate the training pipeline for future civilian recruiters. Finally, the British
Army’s on-going experiment with completely outsourcing its recruiting operations suggests such
changes must be made with care and due diligence and could still be fraught with significant pitfalls.
4.2 Conducting Joint Recruiting
The literature contains a number of proposals to transition from individual service-based recruiting
to some form of joint recruiting. For example, Brown (2008) examines whether joint recruiting
among the four military services would allow for mission accomplishment at a lower cost. She
explores three joint recruiting options: combining only administrative functions across the services,
combining only support functions across the services, or combining all functions down to the re-
cruiter level. She concludes:
The preponderance of the research data and this paper conclude, that while money
might be saved in the long run by implementing full joint recruiting, combining admin-
istrative and support functions is a better option for the armed forces and the nation
(Brown, 2008, p. 1).
In a similar vein, in 2010, the Military Operations Research Society convened a special meeting to
examine issues related to personnel and national security. One of the working groups recommended
that DoD “[c]onsider Joint pilots/initiatives that support unity of command and unity of effort” as
a recruiting best practice (MORS, 2010, p. 18).
At the Army service level, March et al. (1999) propose creating a new “Total Army Recruiting
Command” that would combine active component Army recruiting with Army reserve and national
guard recruiting. In particular, they advocate
...the creation of a new Total Army Recruiting Command led by the Army National
Guard. The ARNG structure would be the backbone of this command, state staffs would
be augmented with other components, and one combined accession mission would be
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assigned to multi-component recruiting teams; teams trained and able to recruit for all
components. Restructuring USAREC, by dissolving five brigade and forty-one battal-
ion staffs, would allow many mid-level leaders to return to active units that are under-
manned and stretched thin with a high operational tempo.
March et al. (1999) assert that joint USAREC-ARNG recruiting would have a number of benefits,
including that shared facilities would save money, enhance integration, and better serve applicants.
They further recommend that the National Guard should “take charge” of the AC DEP soldiers
(March et al., 1999, p. vi) and they conclude that,
In an era of limited resources and the desire for total Army integration, this concept of
seamless recruiting should be considered. A major structural change could accomplish
the realization of efficiencies, reduce component competition and increase production,
better serve the prospects, and lead to an integrated Army (March et al., 1999, p. vii).
In all of our meetings with U.S. military recruiters and each of the services’ recruiting commands,
when asked about whether joint recruiting was possible, the interviewees all said that service-
specific recruiting was a necessity. Without exception, it always came down to the assertion that
only members of a given service could effectively recruit for that service. Yet, in our visit to the
Australia’s Defence Force Recruiting we observed an effective joint recruiting organization in oper-
ation. Under the Australian recruiting model, each military service set its own recruit standards and
requirements for the DFR to execute.
4.3 Improving Recruiter Selection, Screening and/or Training
Various authors and reports have suggested that military recruiting could be made more efficient
and/or effective by improving how recruiters are selected and trained. For example, Worthington
et al. (2000, p. 30) says,
It is time to pay as much attention to the recruiter as we do to the potential recruit.
More emphasis is needed on recruiter screening, including specific aptitude tests to
help predict who will succeed as a military recruiter.
Jenkins (1999, p. 24) says that “emerging evidence suggests that personality traits do have an impact
on recruiting” he and goes on to say, “The selection of recruiters must change so that the recruiting
effort may change in a way to aggressively compete with the environment” (p. 24). Ultimately,
Jenkins recommends that the U.S. Army:
1. Continue the use of successful personality trait identification.
2. Incorporate the results of the trait study into recruiter selection process.
3. Change the Program of Instruction at the Recruiting School to reinforce identified successful
personality traits.
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4. Modify recruiter selection process away from MOS percentages (quotas) to a personality trait
based selection method (p. 28).
Jenkins’ research cited a Government Accountability Office report that says,
DOD could enhance the success of its recruiters if the services strengthened key aspects
of their systems for selecting and training recruiters. Only the Air Force requires per-
sonnel experienced in recruiting to interview candidates for recruiting positions and
uses selection tests to screen interviewees for recruiting duty (GAO, 1998, p. 3).
In their report, the GAO goes on to say,
The Air Force has the most extensive screening program, relying heavily on a team of
experienced, senior recruiters to interview candidates. In contrast, many Army and
Marine recruiting candidates are interviewed by personnel in their current chain of
command who may not have recruiting experience. The Navy is beginning to change
its recruiter selection procedures to more closely resemble those of the Air Force (p. 4).
And, “to enhance the performance of recruiters and the retention of recruits” the GAO ultimately
recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to:
• use experienced field recruiters to interview in person all potential recruiters and use commu-
nication skills as a key recruiter selection criterion;
• develop or procure personality screening tests that can aid in the selection of recruiters; . . .
• link recruiter awards more closely to recruits’ successful completion of basic training; and
• encourage the use of quarterly floating goals as an alternative to the services current systems
of monthly goals (GAO, 1998, p. 6).
Now, while the Navy has developed and validated a recruiter screening methodology (Cotton, 2011;
Penney & Borman, 2007), it is our understanding that the Recruiter Assessment Battery (RAB) has
not been implemented throughout the Navy, and where it has been implemented the operational
need for recruiters has precluded screening out those the RAB might identify as not best suited for
recruiting.
4.4 Leveraging the Internet and Social Media
In 2010, the Military Operations Research Society convened a “Special Meeting” entitled Personnel
and National Security: A Quantitative Approach. Among its many recommendations, the report
said, “...social media is growing in popularity among today’s youth and it is critical that services take
advantage of the marketing potential for recruiting efforts. Social media provides the opportunity
for market identification and targeted marketing” (MORS, 2010, p. 16). The report went on to say,
“Understand perceived IT barriers and adapt/adjust current IT policies and procedures” (MORS,
2010, p. 18).
Similarly, Walsh (2010, p. 18) says,
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The transition from mass communications to an emphasis on social media as a re-
cruiting tool is a major paradigm shift from traditionally accepted, ‘tried and true’
recruiting operations. The Recruiting Commands’ established worldwide methods of
cold calling e-mail spam, personal referrals, and limited face-to-face opportunities do
not address the near-term generational challenges and opportunities... Optimizing the
advantages of social media for connecting with our youngest generation gets at the
core of generation Y and I information-mining desires.
And, Walsh (2010, p. 26–27) goes on to say that
...integrating local recruiting station into cyber social networks to reach the targeted
audience in the right medium will empower the Army recruiting force to successfully
man the all-volunteer Army for the near-future. Past practices no longer suffice. Cur-
rent temporary fixes are not adequate. It’s a new ball game. We can win it, if we play
smart – smart in terms of our audience that needs new and more effective methods
centered on their needs, and not on our own comfortable preferences and practices.
Similarly, Worthington et al. (2000, p. 30) say,
A viable and interactive internet presence is needed which will “think nationally and
act locally”. Military recruiting sites need to function as true gateways to military
service. Recruiters need to be much more internet-savvy and need to be provided with
customized sales tools which use the internet for presentations and information.
Of course, there are risks to the use of social media, particularly if the authority to use it is delegated
to the individual recruiters. However, Walsh (2010, p. 23) concludes that:
Recruiters’ uses of social media can be risky, but with the appropriate leadership, pol-
icy guidance and supervision by commanders and website administrators, recruiters
can use social media to reach targeted audiences with minimal risks of inappropriate
comments and misperception among youth population groups from the Army recruiting
force.
Some have also proposed various forms of virtual recruiting. For example, Dodge (1999, p. 44)
proposes an entirely on-line recruiting station and says,
The Online Recruiting Station has the potential to resolve many of the problems cur-
rently faced by military recruiting commands. It is a fresh alternative to the traditional
approaches of the military when recruiting becomes difficult. The current organiza-
tional structure of military recruiting commands is large and inefficient. On top of
44
that, recruiters are perceived by many youth as being less than trustworthy and they
currently represent the first line of contact between a prospective recruit and the mili-
tary. Adding more recruiters just does not make sense when the factors are taken into
account. Perhaps it is time for the military to consider alternatives that will not only
solve the persistent recruiting problem, but be productive well into the next century.
Others have proposed virtualizing some parts of the recruiting process. For example, Gill (2005, p.
16) says,
...USAREC must develop an online application that can be filled out by the potential
applicant and submitted to the recruiter. The completed and accurate application docu-
ment should then be forwarded electronically to the Mental [SIC] Entrance Processing
Station (MEPS) to continue the enlistment process. The electronic application and fin-
ished online enlistment documents should then be fed electronically into the PERSCOM
/ Human Resource system to populate the entire Soldiers’ documents upon enlistment.
As discussed in Chapter 2, all of the services have some form of social media presence, though
they vary in terms of the specific sites and types of social media, service policies for who can use
the sites and how they use them, and particularly with the authorizations individual recruiters have
to engage potential recruits on social media. Similarly, the services all have different policies and
emphasis on virtual recruiting, from USAREC that has put a significant amount of resources into a
virtual recruiting presence and infrastructure to MCRC that emphasizes the personal interaction of
their recruiters with applicants.
Which of the services’ approaches is most effective for military recruiting is still yet to be deter-
mined. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, what is clear is that Millennials are highly engaged with
social media and other forms of communication and there is every reason to expect that the post-
Millennial generations will be even more engaged. What is also clear is that the use of the Internet
and Internet-enabled technologies continue to rapidly change, which means that predicting what
types of technology, social media, as well as the most popular communication modes of the next
generation – even just a few years into the future – is subject to a great deal of uncertainty.
4.5 Other Recruiting Alternatives
A variety of other military recruiting improvements have been proposed in the literature, such as
expanding the recruiting market, modifying recruiter incentives, methods for reducing DEP attrition,
and the perennial favorite: recruit incentives. Each of these is briefly discussed in this section.
4.5.1 Expanding the Recruiting Market
Some have proposed expanding the recruiting market. For example, Worthington et al. (2000, p.
12) says,
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Expand the primary recruiting market from 17 to 21 year olds to 17 to 25 year olds.
Shift the specific military recruiting focus from graduating high school seniors to 18-
25 year olds with some college education. Allow certified, home-schooled high school
graduates who score high on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) to be as-
sessed as “high-quality" recruits.”
In fact, the current Navy target market is 17 to 24 year olds, which is in keeping with the recom-
mendation by Worthington et al. (2000). However, in discussions with recruiters from the various
services, they do still seem to concentrate more on the high school market and less on those who
start but do not complete college. In addition, the classification of recruit quality in terms of high
school graduation and AFQT score is still problematic for recruiting home-schooled applicants.
4.5.2 Modifying Recruiter Incentives
Each of the services has recruiter non-monetary incentive programs to encourage performance.
These are all generally based around various types of individual and unit awards. For example,
a Navy recruiter can earn awards such as the Gold Wreath award, the Six-Shooter award, and the
Admiral’s Accelerator award for achieving various recruiting goals, including goals for diversity,
special programs, and recruit quality (McGlocking, 2013, p. 5). Recruiters can also earn a Navy
Achievement medal or a Navy Commendation medal for exceptional recruiting performance.
In spite of, or perhaps because of, these awards, McGlocking (2013, p. 52) found:
The U.S. Navy Awards and Incentives System may be counter-productive in incentiviz-
ing recruiters to meet their Net Contract Objective goals. ... If recruiters have not
made their recruit contract goals by the last week of the month, statistical analysis in
this thesis shows that recruiters are highly likely to recruit a low quality individual
because they are easier to recruit and are probably waiting on the recruiter’s call to
service.
Over the years, there have been any number of recommendations for changing the incentives in
various ways. For example, Worthington et al. (2000, p. 30) state that “More incentive programs for
recruiters are needed to help create and motivate the career recruiting force.” McGlocking (2013, p.
52) more specifically recommends:
...that a special bonus-point category within the Enlisted Recruiter Incentive System
(ERIS) program that is only authorized to be earned during the last week of the month
should be initiated. Recruiters would earn the bonus points for writing recruit contracts
for recruits who have the lowest probability of being low quality during the last week of
any given month. Also, to earn these points, recruiters must recruit a minimum number
of high quality individuals during the month as determined by CNRC.
In a similar vein, Pry (1996) proposed an incentive-based system called the Production Recruiting
Incentive Model (PRIME). As described by Pry, “PRIME is a mechanism designed to maximize
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market potential, provide an equitable reward program, and obtain important market information in
order to allow for better resource allocation decisions” Pry (1996, p. v). One of the goals of PRIME
was to incentivize recruiters to maximally recruit from their region rather than to minimally meet
their allocated monthly goal.
Some have gone so far as to recommend monetary bonuses in order to incentivize military recruiters
as one would their civilian counterparts. For example, following the research of Lyons & Reister
(1993), Anderson & Whitaker (1994) investigate the feasibility of replacing the the Army’s goal-
based system with a monetary-based one, concluding that “...simulated monetary bonuses motivate
actual recruiters to increase their estimated recruit production. The authors believe that the Bonus
Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM) mechanism provides the best opportunity for efficient resource
allocation within USAREC” (p. v). They go on to say that, “To determine the actual feasibility
of providing monetary bonuses to recruiters, the authors believe USAREC should further test the
BIRM mechanism and offer actual monetary bonuses to participants in order to determine recruiters
true behavior” (p. 56).
In fact, a monetary bonus scheme was implemented for National Guard recruiting in 2005 and
subsequently terminated in 2012 as a result of a massive fraud scheme (Brook, 2014; Londoño,
2014). As reported in The New York Times:
An Army program meant to increase the number of recruits during the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars devolved into an illegal free-for-all that could cost taxpayers close to $100 million,
military investigators say, describing new details of what they called a long-running
scheme among National Guard recruiters that went undetected for years (Cooper,
2014).
4.5.3 Recruit Incentives
In addition to recruiter incentives, many have recommended improving recruiting by providing any
number of incentives to the recruits themselves. The most basic incentive is financial, where the
Navy offers a monetary bonus to attract individuals into specific occupations. As reported by the
United States Naval Institute News in January of 2014,
Testifying on Thursday at the first House hearing in more than a year on recruiting and
retention, Rear Adm. Annie Andrews said bluntly that enlisted bonuses help the Navy
“get the right sailor to the right place with the right skills at the right time” and that it
was a particularly attractive tool in enticing young men and women who do not show
a propensity for military service (USNI, 2014).
In addition to enlistment bonuses, others have proposed various benefits intended to improve both
recruiting and retention. For example, (Worthington et al., 2000, p. 20) proposed expanding the G.I.
Bill and various loan programs:
• “Allow the Montgomery GI Bill and Service College Funds to be transferred to qualified
spouse and immediate families of eligible servicemen.”
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• “Expand the Department of Defense loan repayment program with new Congressional leg-
islation that broadens the bill beyond current restrictions requiring Department of Education
guarantees and that loans are in good status. Specifically, allow repayment of all loans that
can be documented as being used for the pursuit of post-secondary education and permit
repayment of loans that are in default or in arrears.”
While monetary incentives and expanding benefits improve recruiting, they also represent a real
cost to the Department of Defense. For example, a report by the Bipartisan Policy Center and the
American Enterprise Institute concludes that the DoD spent 42 percent more on service members’
total compensation (including salary, health care, retirement programs, commissaries, and other
services) in 2012 compared to 2001: In 2014 dollars, the difference is $88,000 per service member
in 2001 vs. $125,000 in 2012 (BPC, 2014; The Week, 2014). Indeed, the Secretary of Defense
recently said,
Without serious attempts to achieve significant savings in this area – which consumes
roughly half of the DoD budget and is increasing every year – we risk becoming an
unbalanced force ... one that is well-compensated, but poorly trained and equipped,
with limited readiness and capability (Tilghman, 2013).
In a similar vein, the Bipartisan Policy Center report concludes,
Unless structural changes come soon, the only way to meet the sequester spending caps
set in the Budget Control Act of 2011 would be to continue to shrink the armed forces
or cut other essential portions of the defense budget. There is no doubt that unchecked
personnel cost growth would crowd out other critical investments in training, readiness,
modernization, and innovation (BPC, 2014, p. 6).
4.5.4 Reducing Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition
The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) is most fundamentally a queue of recruits waiting to go to
bootcamp. These individuals have successfully completed the entire recruiting process and have
signed contracts to join the Navy. Hence, the loss of a “DEPer” prior to them shipping to bootcamp
represents a significant waste of recruiting resources. To avoid this, recruiters of all services invest
a significant amount of effort managing the individuals in their DEP queue, and various suggestions
have been put forward about now to reduce DEP attrition.
For example, Johnson (2005) described a Navy effort from 2002 to 2005 to conduct “DEP Family
Expos” that consisted of events held on naval installations, where the DEPpers took tours of Navy
Exchanges, Commissaries, housing areas, recreation centers, and other base facilities. The goal was
to reduce DEP attrition, as well as improve the recruiting process, through parental involvement. In
a subsequent survey of parents who attended an Expo, CNRC concluded that “Those attending DEP
Expo were more informed, more comfortable with DEPer’s decision to join the Navy, and more
aware of Navy Programs” (Johnson, 2005, slide 12).
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In addition, others have proposed using the DEP to ensure that recruits are better prepared for
bootcamp. For example, the GAO (1998, p. 3) says,
Although all the services give recruits in the delayed entry programs access to their
physical fitness facilities and encourage the recruits to become or stay physically fit,
only the Marine Corps conducts regular physical training for recruits who are waiting
to go to basic training. Although recruits who are physically fit are more likely to
complete basic training, only the Marine Corps requires all recruits to take a physical
fitness test before reporting to basic training.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have examined a number of proposed potential improvements described in the
literature, as well as any evidence we have gleaned about whether any of these proposed improve-
ments have been shown to be effective. Returning to the objective of this research, we note that very
few of these proposed recruiting process changes are directly focused on the Millennial and post-
Millennial generations. For example, whether or not joint recruiting, the use of civilian recruiters,
and enhanced recruiter screening will improve the effectiveness of military recruiting overall, there
is no evidence that these changes will specifically boost the recruitment of Millennials and post-
Millennials. The same is true of the proposed recruiting process changes described in Section 4.5.
Of all the ideas proposed in the literature, the only one with clear applicability to the Millennials and
post-Millennials is for military recruiting to expand its presence in social media and other Internet-
enabled virtual environments. Yet, we also must note that while the Millennials and the generations
to follow are on the leading edge of this revolution in information transmission and communication,
as Table 1.1 on page 2 shows, this is also a broad societal transformation. Now, as previously
mentioned, while all of the services already have some form of social media presence, they are still
learning how to most effectively use these media. We’ll come back to this point in Chapter 6 where,
because social media software and trends change rapidly and will likely continue to change, it is
important for the Navy to be able to quickly optimize their recruiting approach within a particular
medium and also be able to promptly adapt as conditions and media change.
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[E]very action you take in product development, in marketing, every conversation you
have, everything you do – is an experiment. If you can conceptualize your work not as
building features, not as launching campaigns, but as running experiments, you can get
radically more done with less effort.
Eric Ries (1979 – )
In this chapter, we discuss why and briefly describe how the Navy should be doing recruiting exper-
iments, including defining what what we mean by the term “experiment,” and we summarize past
efforts to conduct experiments designed to learn about recruiting. While recruiting experiments
have previously been done, they have been few in number, far in the past, and largely restricted to
the Army.
5.1 Why Experiment?
Over 40 years ago, Haggstrom (1973, p. 1) answered this question as follows:
...there is an urgent need for controlled experimentation in the military to assess the
effectiveness of current and proposed personnel programs, especially those associated
with manpower procurement and utilization. In many cases in the past, opportunities
for evaluating new programs have been lost through the servicewide implementation of
new programs that had neither pilot studies before nor follow-up studies after imple-
mentation to analyze their effectiveness. As a result, the military have accumulated a
varied assortment of personnel programs of unknown worth, and they have gained little
reliable information to guide the choice of future policies.
Unfortunately, this is as true today as it was in 1973. As Haggstrom (1973, p. 22) writes, “One
reason that more pilot studies have not been conducted in the past may be that military leaders
tend to be action oriented. Doing an experiment means putting off making a decision until more
information becomes available and may be labeled as indecisiveness, not a highly valued trait in the
military.” However, decision making based on the results of well-conducted empirical experiments
and other studies is more likely to result in better decisions and, as Eric Ries’ quote above notes,
can result in greater organizational efficiencies.
Haggstrom goes on to talk about the obligation of the military to experiment, saying:
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The military services are involved in distributing scarce resources—manpower, talent,
time, equipment, and a tremendous amount of money. Given the magnitude of the costs
associated with erroneous decisions, as well as the foregone opportunities to invest
these resources in other ways, the military has an obligation to evaluate new programs
before they are implemented to see how to strengthen them, to determine whether to
keep them or scrap them, and to learn from them (p. 21).
Recruiting is clearly vital to the health of the Navy. The fact that the recruiting environment changes
over time in response to changes in local and global conditions suggests that an ongoing program
of experimentation might lead to improvement in recruiting efficiency. However, since the Navy
has met its enlisted recruiting goals for the past seven years (DoD, 2014; Langford, 2014), there
is the temptation maintain the status quo, both because it is less labor intensive and because it is
seemingly less risky than making changes to the current system.
Yet, an institutional aversion to making recruiting process changes may be short-sighted for several
reasons. First, it is widely anticipated that the recruiting environment will become more difficult in
the short term, as the national economy recovers, albeit unevenly (Matthews & Tanzi, 2014). Thus in
the near future it may be more important to understand the drivers behind successful recruiting than
it is now. Second, understanding the dynamics of recruiting should, in principle, allow increased
efficiency, freeing resources for other use elsewhere in the Navy. Third, that understanding should
permit flexibility in the face of changes in either the Navy’s recruiting mission or in the outside
world.
For example, if the Navy has an increased need for recruits with certain qualifications or attributes,
understanding the techniques needed to recruit specific individuals will be invaluable. Moreover,
generational changes in the worldview of recruitable individuals (e.g., Millennials and post-Millennials),
and changes in the sorts of competitors that the market offers them, might best be met with changes
in the Navy’s approaches to recruiting and retaining these individuals. That is, as the world changes,
Navy recruiting should presumably change with it. For these reasons, we believe an ongoing pro-
gram of experimentation in recruiting will benefit the Navy in the long term.
5.2 What is an Experiment?
As defined by the the Oxford Dictionaries, an experiment is “A scientific procedure undertaken to
make a discovery, test a hypothesis, or demonstrate a known fact.” For the purposes of military
recruiting, an experiment is conducted when two or more different inputs are used in a recruiting
process, with the goal of assessing the differences in the system’s output that are associated with
that change of input. An experiment is performed on an experimental unit, which for our purposes
will usually be a single recruit. (We can also imagine experiments being performed on recruiters,
allowing some to set their own hours, for example, and then perhaps trying to measure their job
satisfaction, but here we consider the recruit as the experimental unit.) The treatment is the set of
inputs applied to that recruit. These might be bonuses or programs; they might be techniques like
assigning a recruiter of a similar ethnicity; or something else. Of course, each recruit can receive
only one set of treatments. We will measure the result, the outcome of interest for each recruit and
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aggregate those outcomes across stations (or districts or some other unit of aggregation). A recruit’s
outcome might be whether he or she completed initial training, but it might also be survival through
the Delayed Entry Program, completion of A school, or another result of interest.
The goal is to evaluate the change in output from the recruiting station – perhaps number of recruits
per recruiter per month – associated with a change in input – say, bonus programs or other terms
offered. In a laboratory experiment it is often fairly straightforward to change only a few inputs and
to keep the remainder constant. If these inputs are under the control of the experimenter, and the
experiment can be replicated at will, the results of the experiment can be used to draw conclusions
about the effects of the inputs on the outputs. Of course there is usually some noise in measure-
ments: we don’t expect identical recruits to take identical actions. Therefore, it is important that the
experiment operate on enough experimental units that the effect of changing the inputs can be reli-
ably separated from the sort of randomness that would be present anyway. This separation requires
that the analyst have some idea of what the “usual” noise level is, but often that can be estimated by
repeating the experiment a number of times.
In the real world, however, things are more problematic. The “inputs” to the recruiting station’s
productivity include more than just interchangeable attributes like bonuses, programs, or promises
of specialties. Recruiting is affected by external factors like local economic conditions, in the form
of job opportunities for high-school graduates, or competition, in the form of availability of higher
education nearby. For that matter, recruiting is also affected by attributes of the recruiters themselves
– whether they speak the language of the recruit’s parents, perhaps or whether their personality is
compatible with that of the recruit. This sort of input is impossible to replicate. Indeed, no two
recruits face exactly the same recruiting environment. Finally, in the recruiting context the numbers
of recruits per month at a particular station are generally equal to, or very close to, the station’s
mission. Recruiters have a very strong incentive to meet their mission but little incentive to produce
too many more recruits. Experiments that try to measure the increased number of recruits associated
with a benefit will run into this problem.
These problems do not render an experiment pointless. First, we rely on detecting average effects
across stations (or districts, or other regions). We can never recruit the same person twice, but we can
offer a particular incentive to a number of recruits at one station, and decline to offer that incentive
at another, similar station, and observe the difference in production at those two stations. If the two
stations are exactly identical, in terms of the population they served and all of their other attributes,
then the difference in production would be able to be attributed to the incentive being offered. When
the two stations are similar but not identical, then we try to account for the differences as best we
can. To get at the problem of recruiters always meeting mission, we acknowledge that under the
current system the raw numbers of recruits are likely not going to be a subject of the experiment.
Naturally changing the recruiters’ incentive system is a good long-term approach, but hoping to do
that may be impractical. Instead we design experiments that offer incentives for specific behavior,
to see if we can entice recruits into longer terms, perhaps, or hard-to-fill specialties.
The important problem that experimental designers seek to eliminate is confounding. This is the
statistician’s term for when the effect being measured is correlated with another effect that is not the
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subject of the experiment. For example, imagine that the Navy is interested in the effect on recruiting
of a particular bonus program. They might offer the program at a few stations in June through
September, say; remove the program for the months of October through January; and then compare
the productivity of the stations during those time periods. However, October through January tend
to be more productive months on average anyway. (We recognize that production depends very
closely on assigned mission; this is just an example.) Any increase in October through January
production might be the result of the new program being offered, but it might be the outcome we
would have seen anyway, since those are more productive months. We say that the effect of the
program is “confounded” with the high productivity of the fall months.
Confounding can be subtle. For example, imagine a program in which recruits are offered a program
under which college funding is made available in exchange for a longer commitment. The tempta-
tion is to compare the set of recruits who volunteered for the program to the set who do not. This, of
course, is the problem of self-selection; the two groups of recruits presumably have different goals
and desires. The comparison of recruiting success would be confounded with this unmeasurable
difference between recruits who selected themselves for the program and those who did not.
Instead, suppose that recruits were offered the program at random, with some permitted to accept it
and others not offered it at all. Because the assignment of recruits to programs is random, we can be
confident that, with large enough samples, the group offered the program and the group not offered
it will be similar. In that case the two groups’ performance will differ not because of recruits’ goals
but because of the program – assuming all other confounders are excluded.
The art and science of designing an experiment involves minimizing confounding through random
assignment as well as through other techniques like blocking. It is important that the designer
understand the particulars of the recruiting process in order to design an experiment. Appendix D
describes some of the important considerations in experimental design in more detail, and gives
examples of how they might apply in the recruiting setting.
5.3 What Isn’t an Experiment?
It may be useful to say a few words about approaches that are not experiments. It is common to
impose a new policy, wait a bit, compare the results under the new policy with the results under the
old, and declare that the observed difference is due to the policy change. In the highly-controlled
environment of a laboratory, this may be reasonable, but in manpower and recruiting realms this
conclusion is unwarranted because any observed differences could be due seasonal fluctuations,
changes in external economic factors, changes in deployment rates, and anything else that might
have changed the recruiting environment.
Further, any type of observational study is not an experiment. An observational study is any study
where the assignment of the treatment to subjects is not under the control of the analyst. These
types of studies often arise when the choice of treatment is left to the discretion of the subject, such
as when recruits are given a choice of recruitment options. At issue is that, because the analyst
cannot know how or why each subjects does or does not get a treatment, the results of observational
studies may be confounded with other factors, observed or unobserved, and it is thus impossible to
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conclude that there is a cause and effect relationship between the treatment and outcome.
But that is exactly the desired outcome of any recruiting experiment – we want to be able to say that
treatment “X” causes a particular outcome – and that is the power of conducting formal experiments.
This is not to say that all good ideas must be experiments. Often it is difficult or impossible to
construct a proper control group. For example, Golfin and Katz (Golfin & Katz, 1999b) describe
what they call an “experiment" in which the authors used Internet job-search sites to post Navy
advertisements and detailed recruiters to search sites for resumes of interesting candidates. We do
not agree that this effort is an “experiment” in the strict sense – but we do believe it to have been
valuable.
5.4 Past Recruiting Experiments & Results
In this section we describe what appears to be the entire literature on recruiting experiments across
the U.S. military. This does not include proposals for experiments that were never carried out. As
we noted earlier, the list is quite short and generally consists of items from long ago conducted by
the Army.
5.4.1 Early Work
The first treatment of experimentation in the context of military manpower appears to have been
by Haggstrom (1973). His RAND report appeared around the time that the military was making
the transition to an all-volunteer force and Haggstrom argued for “well-conceived pilot studies to
reevaluate some of the key parameters affecting manpower supply ... and to provide real tests of the
usefulness of changes in personnel practices” (p. iii). This report did not suggest specific experi-
ments; rather, it described how experimentation can be carried out, and it concludes with “the mil-
itary’s obligation to experiment” previously mentioned. A subsequent RAND report (Haggstrom,
1975) describes an experiment conducted by the Army to assess the effect of enlistment contract
alternatives. In that experiment, as Haggstrom says, “Guard and Reserve units in certain states were
permitted to offer potential recruits the option of enlisting in a reserve unit for only three or four
years instead of the usual six-year term.” Figure 5.1 from Haggstrom (1975, p. 8) shows how the
treatment was applied across the states.
The results of the experiment – increases in recruiting rates for both three- and four-year terms were
approximately offset by predictions of increased losses – are interesting, but not directly relevant
to Navy recruiting. What makes the report relevant is that it describes an actual controlled exper-
iment applied to military recruiting. That said, Haggstrom and his collaborators acknowledge that
experimentation in the field with military recruiting is difficult and that his own experiment had
shortcomings “both in design and in execution” (Haggstrom, 1975, p. 65).
For example, states were assigned to one of three groups: those offering three-year terms, those
offering four-year ones, and those offering six-year ones. The allocation of some states was set
by policy, but the others were assigned so that states that had been “hurting” for enlistments were
put, as far as possible, into the treatment groups (Haggstrom, 1975, p. 69). This confounded the
effect of the term offer with the “state effect,” which is the fact that some states produce recruits at
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Figure 5.1: Map of RAND Guard and Reserve experiment from Haggstrom (1975, p. 8).
higher rates than others. This experimental design had the potential to make the term offer look less
effective than it really was, since it was preferentially being offered in states where enlistment was
low anyway. Furthermore, the Army conducted intensive recruiting campaigns during the time of
the experiment, and those campaigns took place “primarily in the 3⇥ 3 [three-year] states” (Hag-
gstrom, 1975, p. 69). Here the effect of confounding the effect of the term offer with the recruiting
campaigns would be to make the term offer look more effective – but there is no way to compare or
disentangle this confounding with the other.
5.4.2 Other Experiments
The Enlistment Bonus Experiment
Polich et al. (1986) describe an experiment in which some Army recruits in some specialties were
offered a standard bonus for a four-year term (but no bonus for a three-year term), others a larger
four-year bonus, and a third group, either the larger bonus or a slightly smaller bonus for a three-
year term. As shown in Figure 5.2, the nation was divided into three “cells,” one for each bonus
program. The first cell, acting as the control group, was offered in districts – Military Entrance
Processing Station areas – covering 70% of the population. The other two programs were offered in
districts covering 15% of the population each. Districts were assigned to cells at random but under
some constraints to control for differences in economic conditions and enlistment rates measured
over the preceding year. The authors also collected economic, advertising and other data during the
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Figure 5.2: Map of RAND enlisted bonus experiment from Polich et al. (1986, p. 18).
course of the study to account for differences among regions.
The conclusion was that the bonus programs could produce gains in the number of high-quality
recruits into the Army, as well as gains in the number of four-year terms selected. The programs
also appeared to be successful in filling specific specialties. Most important from our perspective,
this experiment was well designed and properly implemented.
The 2+2+4 Experiment
In the early 1990’s, Buddin & Polich (1990) described an experiment in which the Army offered
certain recruits the ability to select the so-called “2+2+4” program, under which the recruit would
serve two years on active duty (after training time) in one of a specific set of hard-to-fill noncombat
specialties, followed by two years in the Selected Reserve and four more in the Individual Ready
Reserve. In exchange, the recruit would earn $8,000 in Army College Fund benefits beyond the
usual GI Bill amount.
The study in fact involved two experiments. In one, a random 70% of applicants was given eligibility
for the 2+2+4 program, in additional to all other programs; the other 30% was not offered the 2+2+4.
The Army Recruiting Battalions involved in this experiment comprise “Cell C” in Figure 5.3. This
phase was intended to determine the effect of eligibility on the choice of term length and selection
of specialty areas (since only certain jobs were permitted under the 2+2+4). The design controlled
for the effect of choosing a two-year term, something that was unusual at the time, by allowing even
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Figure 5.3: Allocation of Army recruiting battalions to test cells in the 2+2+4 Experiment from
Buddin & Polich (1990, p. 14).
ineligible recruits the opportunity to select a two-year term (but without the 2+2+4 benefit).
In the second experiment, the nation was divided into three geographic areas matched on certain
demographic and other factors as shown in Figure 5.4. This is an example of blocking (see Section
D.4 in Appendix D). In one, the program was offered to all eligible recruits; in a second, to none
of them; and, in the third, largest group, the program was offered to 70% of eligible recruits chosen
at random. This phase was intended to asses the effect of the program on the total numbers of
recruits. The large cell permits a comparison similar to the one in the first phase of the experiment,
to determine whether recruits are selecting the 2+2+4 option in preference to a four-year term.This
design decision was a wise one, since the cost of offering the 2+2+4 option is both the monetary
cost of the College Fund benefit and also the costs of having a recruit forego a four-year term – with
the concomitant costs of recruiting a replacement, and of maintaining an Army with comparatively
less overall experience.
Preliminary results are given in Buddin & Polich (1990), with follow-up in Buddin (1992). The
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Figure 5.4: Test cell demographic characteristics comparison in the 2+2+4 Experiment from Buddin
& Polich (1990, p. 15).
conclusions are that the program was generally successful in providing an extra set of recruits with
two-year terms, without too much loss in the gain of those with four-year terms. We believe this
experiment to have been well designed, and the analysis attempted to adjust for certain measurable
factors like numbers of recruiters in an area from other services, local unemployment and wage
rates, and so on. In general the 2+2+4 program, like the enlisted bonus program, provides a good
example of what can be done in military recruiting experimentation.
Mailing CD-ROMs
Golfin & Katz (1999a) describe an experiment in which CD-ROMs were mailed to students at
community colleges. The authors, associated with the Center for Naval Analyses, developed the
CD “as a prototype for future efforts” (p. 2). Two-thousand names were randomly selected from a
list of 30,000 names of students at community colleges and vocational schools, the sample being
weighted towards men in a reasonable way. After some mailing difficulties, around 1,900 of the
disks appear to have been delivered. Recipients were instructed to call a special “cyber-recruiting”
office if they were interested. The authors then matched, to the best of their ability, the names of
59
new recruits back to the list of names to whom disks were sent, since in most cases social security
numbers were not available. (They note that some recruits may have been the result of a disks being
passed between friends, but that this effect is very difficult to measure directly.)
Finally, the authors compared the cost per contract for this effort to the cost per contract associated
with other direct mail efforts. The authors note that “[a]ll of the services spend large sums of money
each year mailing form letters and brochures to targeted audiences” (p. 2). This “other direct mail"
rate looked at direct mail sent “to the workforce," which was defined as “anyone in the recruitable
population who is not in high school – including both high school graduates and dropouts” (p. 8).
The conclusion is that the CD-ROM approach is a cost-effective one.
This study suffers, in our opinion, from a couple of flaws. The timing of the delivery was imperfect
– the disks were delivered in February, but the lists were drawn the preceding summer, meaning
they included students who had already graduated. The idea of a random selection of students is a
good one. However, the comparison between cost per contract rates is flawed. The “control” group,
the one to which the community college students are being compared, is not like the “treatment"
group, since the former includes high school dropouts and working graduates. We would expect
community college students to be more academic than these groups; the extent to which that would
affect recruitability is unclear. A better choice might have been to send one set of mailings including
a CD-ROM to a randomly selected group of community college students, and a second mailing
without the disk to a second random group of community college students. (For higher precision, the
groups might have been selected with an eye towards balancing geographic areas or areas of study;
see section D.4.) Had two random samples been used, any difference between the two contract rates
could have been attributed mostly to the presence or absence of the CD in the mailing.
The Marketing-Enhanced Recruiting Stations Experiment
Fricker & Fair (2003) describe the beginnings of an experiment in which a “marketing-enhanced
recruiting station” (MERS) was put in place at a Virginia shopping mall. This station had video
screens showing promotional videos, computers with access to military web sites, and other high-
tech accoutrements – even an exercise area for recruits, whose use was disallowed because of lia-
bility concerns. Unlike a standard station, the MERS included recruiters from all five services and
incorporated a marketing mission as well as a recruiting one. Originally the services planned to
create thirty such stations and then evaluate their performance.
As it happens, no other MERS were ever built. Fricker & Fair (2003) make a number of interest-
ing comparisons from what data is available (for example, from other, standard stations located in
shopping malls). But even evaluating the performance of the single MERS is difficult, because its
uniqueness was not exploited by the services. For example, the nearby recruiting station stayed
open; there was “[no] type of marketing or advertising to exploit the station location,” nor did re-
cruiters work on Thursday or Friday evenings, or on weekends, when the mall had large numbers of
visitors (Fricker & Fair, 2003, p. xviii). There is information to be learned, but with the cancellation
of the program, this was ultimately an aborted experiment that never lived up to its initial goal.
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5.5 Summary
The set of actual recruiting experiments performed is very small. Our beliefs as to why this it true
are purely conjectural, but we expect that it is driven at least partly by the unwillingness to disrupt
a system that is currently working. An experiment requires people, so the cost of conducting one
is non-zero, and it might be high if it involves, say, giving out new bonuses. Of course it is always
easier to continue current operations within an existing budget than to potentially disrupt operations
with an experiment that also may require securing additional funding to execute. The successful
experiments we describe here required the endorsement of high-ranking military officials.
Many experiments require a lot of training of recruiters and their supervisors, and since these people
are already busy they might resent having to implement unproven approaches, particularly if they
feel that have been in a disadvantageous position compared to the peers against whom they compete
for promotion. (They might equally welcome flexibility and innovation.) In any experiment it
will be important to provide the proper incentives to recruiters. If recruiters have, as their primary
incentive, producing the number of recruits in their mission, then that is the goal to which they will
devote their time, and an experiment that is seen as interfering with that mission will probably not
receive the consideration it deserves. Experimenters may need to work with recruiters and their
supervisors to ensure that recruiters are given incentives to conduct the experiment and rewarded if
they do. A recruiter cannot believe that he or she will be punished for, for example, being assigned
to a control group.
Unfortunately, the lack of scientific study is not unique to military recruiting. A recent discussion
on National Public Radio speaks to this:
Here’s a reality of public policy. You know, government programs that affect the econ-
omy or public safety or individual’s lives. The reality is when we debate public policy;
we often have no idea what we’re talking about. Even members of Congress may some-
times have no idea because they can’t. We do not analyze public policy with anywhere
close to the scientific rigor with which we analyze the efficacy of drugs or the safety of
cars. We don’t study it in that way (Vedantam, 2014).
The discussion goes on to say:
I think it’s worth mentioning ... the value here is in applying scientific tools to un-
derstanding public policy in order to make it smarter. It really makes no sense that
marketers selling toys have better data on what works and what doesn’t than policy
makers who are spending billions and billions of dollars (Vedantam, 2014).
Hence, though we acknowledge the difficulties in conducting military recruiting experiments, ulti-
mately we must agree with Haggstrom (1973) that the services have an obligation to experiment in
order to determine how to operate more efficiently. As we discuss further in Chapter 6, it is impor-
tant to establish an on-going experimentation program since, by the time the results are needed it is
too late to start experimenting.
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CHAPTER 6:
Putting It All Together: Findings & Recommendations
To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.
Winston Churchill (1874 – 1965)
In this chapter, we bring together everything from Chapters 1 through 5 in order to provide CRNC
with actionable recommendations for improving Navy recruiting, particularly for the Millennial and
post-Millennial generations. In doing so, we return to the questions we asked in Chapter 1:
• What strategies should Navy recruiting be considering to best entice the Millennial generation
to enlist in the Navy?
• What strategic plans and decisions should Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC)
be making today to lay the groundwork for the post-Millennial recruit of tomorrow?
In developing our recommendations, we were tasked to “Identify and evaluate past alternative re-
cruiting efforts with an emphasis on assessing the quantitative evidence (if any) of performance.”
The goal was to identify proven recruiting strategies and methods and, when we began this research,
we anticipated synthesizing an extensive literature containing empirical evaluations of the various
recruiting strategies and methods. However, as Chapter 5 makes clear, very little empirical assess-
ment has been done in either civilian or military recruiting.
Thus, in this chapter we propose potential improvements to Navy recruiting, some of which seem
to be obvious improvements, but all of which need to be carefully evaluated before full-scale im-
plementation. This leads to one of our major recommendations: the military recruiting community
must establish a program of research and experimentation focused on testing new recruiting ap-
proaches in order to improve how military recruiting is done. More on this point later in the chapter.
This chapter is organized in terms of “Findings,” which are conclusions we have reached based
on the information we collected and summarized in Chapters 1 through 5. Typically, a finding
is a current need or an observed shortcoming in current military recruiting processes, where the
focus in on shortcomings for most effectively recruiting Millennials and post-Millennials. The
“Recommendations” that follow the findings are intended to address the need or shortcoming, again
in the context of recruiting Millennials and post-Millennials.
Note that we cannot calculate the increase in recruiting efficiency or return on investment (ROI) for
each of our recommendations. To do so would require information that is not available in the liter-
ature, where we didn’t find any data on efficiency improvements or ROI for our recommendations.
This brings us back to the need for experimentation, where the experimentation must be done in
such a way that decision makers can both evaluate whether the change is effective and whether the
performance improvement is worth the effort and cost to implement.
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6.1 Millennial and Post-Millennial Recruiting Recommendations
As described in Chapter 3, members of Generation Z are the first true digital natives and the Millen-
nials are both high users of technology and very technically savvy. Millennials are more connected
than any previous generation and all trends indicate that future generations will only be more con-
nected. Phrased as a question we can state the issue as follows:
Issue: Does the current communications technology provided to Navy recruiters meet the minimum
requirements to enable recruitment of the Millennial generation?
Now, while it is quite a challenge to keep up with the pace of technological change today, it is
imperative that NRC does so in order to ensure that Navy recruiters can most effectively and effi-
ciently communicate with Millennials and post-Millennials. This leads to our first and perhaps most
obvious finding.
Finding: Recruiting organizations must be at the technological forefront of the on-going digital
revolution in order to most effectively communicate with, interact with, and recruit members of the
Millennial and post-Millennial generations.
Returning to Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 (see page 2), almost 100% of the American public uses cell
phones, more than half of Americans own smartphones (Smith, 2013) – with 85% of Millennials
owing smartphones (Nielsen, 2014) – and some predict that by 2020 virtually all cell phones will
be smartphones (Dediu, 2013). Over two years ago now, in a September 2012 survey, PewResearch
concluded that “fully 95% of all teens ages 12-17 are now online” (PewResearch, 2013). Further-
more, as we discussed in Chapter 3, Millennials expect to be able to communicate easily via their
media and technology of choice.
Finding: The technology provided to Navy recruiters (smartphones and laptops) lags what is used
by Millennials, the commercial sector, and the other military services.
The Army, Marine Corps and Air Force recruiters we visited all had and are using smartphones. In
contrast, the Navy recruiters we visited had much older phones. Furthermore, as recently reported
by Nielsen:
Millennials are one of the largest population segments in the U.S., totaling about 77
million, on par with Baby Boomers. And these young consumers are the largest segment
of smartphone owners. In the second-quarter 2014, 85% of Millennials aged 18-24 own
devices and 86% aged 25-34 own them, an increase from 77% and 80%, respectively,
in second-quarter 2013 (Nielsen, 2014).
These findings lead to the following recommendations.
• Recommendation 1: Outfit Navy recruiters with the latest smartphones and laptops and,
in the future, whatever technology replaces smartphones and laptops. The Navy is now
the only service whose recruiters are not outfitted with smartphones. By “latest smartphones,”
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we mean that the phones must have the most up-to-date functionality and they must be capa-
ble of accessing the latest communication modes and media used by the current generation,
which today includes texting, e-mail, and web browsing for access to social media.
• Recommendation 2: Refresh Navy recruiter technology (smartphones and laptops) at
least every three years. Given the rapid pace of technological change, it is critical that NRC
continually refresh recruiter technology or it will quickly become dated, creating barriers to
communications with the target recruiting population.
– This suggests an recurring annual budgetary requirement for smartphone and laptop re-
placement costs for at least one-third of the recruiting staff. As a new NRC requirement,
which is on the order of $2-3 million per year.
– It also suggests that NRC N6 will to need possess the resources and expertise to track
the marketplace so that the most appropriate technology is bought and fielded and the
enterprise-wide IT system is continually maintained and upgraded to support the new
technology.
• Recommendation 3: Use commercial networks, to the greatest extent possible, to sup-
port Navy recruiter communication systems and operations. While there will always be
a need to use military networks such as NMCI and NGEN, emphasis should be given to hav-
ing recruiters on the same networks as applicants, which means using commercial networks
rather than military intranets whenever possible. The goal here is to mitigate barriers to the
easy and smooth communication between recruiters and applicants, where Millennials expect
smooth communications and they will balk at anything less.
– Of course, it is imperative that applicant information is fully protected, which means the
necessary and appropriate security must be built into the systems. However, excessive
security requirements, particularly unique military requirements, should be avoided to
the greatest extent possible. Key is to appropriately balance data breach risks with the
very real mission costs that accrue to NRC when recruiter-applicant communications
are impeded. Emphasis must be placed on the potential recruits user experience with
the system and ensuring that it is positive.
– Networks must also have sufficient bandwidth and data capacity so that recruiters have
capabilities that exceed those of the applicants they are working to enlist in the Navy.
This is both an issue of recruiter operational efficiency and one of U.S. Navy appearance
– it is hard to convince an applicant that he or she is joining a high-tech organization if
the recruiter is using outdated technology.
Recommendations 1 through 3 suggest that NRC N2/N6 must have or develop an organic capability
for regularly assessing and evaluating commercial technology, including identifying leading edge,
but mature, technology for fielding to recruiters. Similarly, NRC must have contracting capabilities
for executing annual technology purchases in support of the recruiters in the field, including the
ability to negotiate favorable pricing from vendors in order to exploit efficiencies of scale, and the
ability to distribute and maintain the technology in the field.
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Now, in addition to ensuring that Navy recruiters have the technology to efficiently and effectively
communicate with Millennials, Millennials expect to be able to use social and other media to learn
about and interact with the Navy, leading to the following question:
Issue: Are standard mediums of communication (brick and mortar, telephonic) adequate to facilitate
the interaction between recruiter and the Millennial generation?
Finding: NRC virtual recruiting and social media enterprises both require expansion to meet Mil-
lennial and post-Millennial expectations.
As Mr. Paul Colley, marketing manager for Royal Navy recruiting said, “We need to message into
their reality” (Colley, 2014). To do so requires a relevant presence on the necessary media, using
current hardware and software, in order to convey the appropriate message content and other in-
formation. This is as simple as the fact that recruiters need to interact with applicants using the
communication medium or media that the applicants use and this finding leads to a number of addi-
tional recommendations.
• Recommendation 4: Expand NRC’s virtual recruiting enterprise, to include increased
capacity and the capability to initiate applications that can then be passed electronically
to local recruiters. While there will always be a need for recruiters to interact personally with
applicants, it is also true that much of recruiting support process can or will be virtualized.
For example, in the commercial sector, most initial job applications are processed completely
electronically. Furthermore, Millennials expect to use the Internet-based technology to both
learn about the Navy and to interact with the Navy (Fromm & Garton, 2013). In this effort,
NRC should explore USAREC’s virtual recruiting model as a benchmark against which to
design, field and operate its system (see Chapter 2 and Section A.1 in Appendix A.)
• Recommendation 5: Ensure all Navy recruiting websites, social media, and all other
Internet-based communications are optimized for mobile devices like smartphones. Mil-
lennials use their mobile devices for the majority of their electronic interaction, including tex-
ting, e-mail, social media interaction, and other Internet-based activities (Fromm & Garton,
2013). The post-Millennial generations are expected to be even more mobile device depen-
dent. Because of this, it is imperative that all Navy media be optimized so that applicants
have exceptional experiences on their mobile devices.
• Recommendation 6: Structure Navy systems, policies & procedures, marketing, and re-
cruiter training so that potential applicants have a consistent experience throughout the
recruiting process. As the modes by which an applicant can interact with Navy recruiting
proliferate (mass advertising, Internet-based media, virtual recruiting chats, telephone, and
face-to-face with local recruiters), it is important that the messages and information are syn-
chronized. A good benchmark, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2, is the Royal Navy
that explicitly manages “tone of voice” across their recruiting enterprise, where they want
the applicant to have the same experience whether he or she “calls, clicks, or comes in.” As
CAPT Cameron, RN describes, message inconsistencies and disconnects can arise between
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the marketing and operational sides of a recruiting organization and, as more processes be-
come virtualized it is important to ensure messaging and applicant experiences across media
and systems are consistent.
• Recommendation 7: Implement policies and procedures that allow, encourage, and train
Navy recruiters to establish a local social media presence and to use that presence to
effectively recruit in their local communities. Appropriately applied, social media can be
an effective way to establish and nurture networks among new recruits (DEPpers), current
and interested applicants, and potential and future applicants. To do so, local recruiters must
have the ability and skills to create and maintain social media sites at the local level. As
discussed in Chapter 3, Millennials and post-Millennials expect social media to be interactive
and relevant at the personal level. That is, they expect to be able to individually interact with
another person via social media, and they expect the interaction to be personalized. Using
social media as a mass advertising outlet does not work with Millennials and, in fact, is
viewed negatively. Other services allow their local recruiters to maintain local recruiting sites
and to (appropriately) use social media for recruiting activities.
Ultimately, what these recommendations come down to is that NRC and Navy recruiters need to
operate at the forefront of the on-going digital revolution. This presents a number of management,
technological, and contracting challenges for a large government agency like NRC, but it is an
imperative if the Navy want to be seen as: (1) an employer of choice to Millennials and post-
Millennials, and (2) the high-technology organization that it is.
In terms of the latter point, it is not enough for the Navy to advertise itself as a high technology
organization. As discussed in Chapter 3, Millennials are skeptical of advertising. The Navy’s repre-
sentatives – i.e., Navy recruiters – must demonstrate that it is a high technology service and one way
to do this is to ensure that recruiters have leading edge communications and other technology. Sim-
ply put, Millennials observing recruiters who show up with outdated flip phones and older laptops
will then discount all the advertising claims touting the Navy as a high technology organization.
6.2 NRC-as-a-Learning-Organization Strategic Changes
A strategic objective in Navy Recruiting Command’s 2013 Business Plan is to “become a learning
organization” (CNRC, 2014, enclosure (1), p. 9). In support of this objective, the Business Plan says
NRC will “[d]evelop and implement Knowledge Management systems within Navy Recruiting to
capitalize on training and foster organizational learning.” And, as discussed in Section 2.1, the
Business Plan also says that NRC will “continually adapt our business to the dynamic recruiting
market” (CNRC, 2014, enclosure (1), p. 3). Stated as a question then,
Issue: How does NRC become a learning organization?
We fully agree that NRC must become a learning organization in order to effectively adapt Navy
recruiting to changes in the market, a market that is rapidly evolving as a result of many factors.
However, we suggest that the implementation of a knowledge management system, while helpful,
will only facilitate individual learning within the organization – it will not make NRC a learning
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organization.
In a Harvard Business Review article, Garvin et al. (2008) say that:
Leaders may think that getting their organizations to learn is only a matter of articulat-
ing a clear vision, giving employees the right incentives, and providing lots of training.
This assumption is not merely flawed–it’s risky in the face of intensifying competition,
advances in technology, and shifts in customer preferences.
They go on to say,
Organizational research over the past two decades has revealed three broad factors
that are essential for organizational learning and adaptability: a supportive learning
environment, concrete learning processes and practices, and leadership behavior that
provides reinforcement.
Finding: In order to become a learning organization, NRC must go beyond the establishment of a
Knowledge Management system.
That is, in order to become a learning organization, NRC must implement organization-level struc-
tural changes that will establish, promote, and nurture a culture of exploration and innovation in
NRC. In particular, in an organization like NRC, where all aspects of the operation are optimized
towards making monthly and annual recruiting targets, the challenge is to establish an organizational
capacity outside of the daily pressures of making goal that can reflect, experiment, and innovate.
Only then will the organization be able to learn how to change recruiting methods and processes in
order to adapt to the market, including the Millennial and post-Millennial generations.
Now, this research effort is perhaps a first effort at learning about new recruiting practices so that
NRC could adapt to the changing youth market. Unfortunately, as Chapter 5 is discusses in detail,
since the implementation of the all-volunteer force, there is been little to no research conducted that
would provide a rigorous, scientific basis upon which to make recruiting system change recommen-
dations.
Finding: There is no experimental or other empirical evidence upon which to understand how
recommended changes to the recruiting system – including those listed here and those described in
Chapter 4 – will perform.
The need for conducting experimentation to improve military recruiting is not new: both Haggstrom
(1973) and Fricker & Fair (2003) have previously argued for its need. In the sciences, recognition
that experimentation is the foundation of knowledge is centuries old. For example, in 1902 Henri
Poincaré said, “Experiment is the sole source of truth. It alone can teach us something new; it alone
can give us certainty” (Poincaré, 2011).
As discussed in Chapter 5, the few experiments that have been conducted were done decades ago and
thus provide little relevant information for recruiting the Millennial and post-Millennial generations.
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Yet, doing such experiments is not farfetched; for example, the field of Behavioral Economics is
starting to bring experimentation to social science and public policy (Harford, 2014).
This finding leads to a number of recommendations which we consider critical to advancing the
practice of military recruiting in the United States.
• Recommendation 8: Establish a program of relevant experiment-based research that
will inform how NRC adapts to future recruiting environments and challenges and sup-
ports data driven decision-making at all levels. The goal of these experiments is to learn
about and demonstrate break-through innovations in military recruiting. This recommenda-
tion is consistent with NRC’s strategy to “Become a Learning Organization” (CNRC, 2012,
enclosure (1), p. 9), but it extends well beyond the notion of developing and implementing
knowledge management systems – it is about generating knowledge. This recommendation
is also in accordance with a recent Secretary of Defense memorandum on innovation, where
Secretary Hagel wrote: “We are entering an era where American dominance in key warfight-
ing domains is eroding, and we must find new and creative ways to sustain, and in some areas
expand, our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources.” He went on to say, “we
need to continue to further examine our business practices and find ways to be more efficient
and effective” (Hagel, 2014). See Appendix E.
• Recommendation 9: Create an organization within NRC with the expertise, resources,
authority, and freedom to conduct recruiting experiments. That is, in order to conduct
rigorous and effective experiments, NRC must establish an internal organization that has the
necessary:
– Expertise, which includes both statistical expertise to rigorously design and analyze the
experiments and recruiting expertise to help design, select and appropriately implement
the experiments in the field;
– Resources, which includes both sufficient numbers of the personnel just described, but
also access to actual recruiting resources so that the experiments can be conducted in
the field under real-world conditions;
– Authority, which includes both the authority to conduct experiments within the regions
and districts and an independent budget that will support the experiments and to cut
across organizational lines; and,
– Freedom, which includes both the ability to draw from various parts of NRC to support
experiments and, most importantly, the capability to conduct experiments outside of
region, district, and station mission goals. In addition, the organization must have the
freedom to fail because not all experiments will work, and of those that do, not all will
be deemed worthy of implementation.
In particular, freeing experiments from the pressure of organizational recruiting goals is ab-
solutely critical to their success. As Fricker & Fair (2003) discuss at length, experiments
conducted within the recruit goaling system are destined to failure in the sense that they will
fail to identify practices that improve recruiting performance. While this will require short-
term impositions on the Navy recruiting enterprise, in which some recruiting assets will not
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be working directly towards the current mission, an appropriately executed continuing pro-
gram of experimentation will result in NRC – as an organization – learning how to conduct
operations more efficiently and effectively. Over the the long term, this will free up resources.
To illustrate the idea of experimentation, NRC could conduct an experiment that assesses whether
the Recruiter Assessment Battery (RAB) effectively identifies Navy recruiters who will perform
well in the field. One motivation for the experiment is the anecdotal evidence that recruiter screen-
ing has contributed to better recruiter performance for the Air Force (see GAO, 1998 and the discus-
sion in Section 2.3). While the RAB has been validated psychometrically, no evaluation has been
conducted to determine whether it is useful for predicting recruiter performance in the operational
recruiting environment. Furthermore, while the RAB is being administered to at least some poten-
tial recruiters, the screening “cut-off” score is currently set so low that NRC does not turn anyone
away for a lack of innate recruiting ability (Noble, 2013).
The basic idea of this experiment would be to use the RAB to assess a cohort of new recruiters, then
follow their performance in the field, and then assess how well their RAB scores predict their field
performance. Of course, there would be a number of technical challenges (as well as organizational
challenges) with conducting this experiment, including the following.
• As previously discussed, recruiter performance is not independent of assigned mission quotas
and, in fact, is generally strongly influenced by mission quota. Hence, the experiment would
need to be conducted using some recruiters who are either not assigned an explicit monthly
mission, which presents a risk to NRC and the organizations in a given recruiter’s chain of
command that he or she will not perform as well without a goal, or who are assigned higher
than normal missions so that not everyone makes their goal.
• In addition, the availability of recruits and their propensity to enlist in the military varies by
geographic location. Thus, a valid experiment will have to control for these factors (as much
as possible) before evaluating RAB effectiveness. However, there are a number of experiment
design schemes that could be employed to control for these external sources of variation; the
challenge here would be rigorous experimental design within the constraints of the existing
systems and obtaining organizational buy-in throughout the chain of command.
• Finally, as discussed in Chapter 5 and Appendix D, the recruiters and their chain of command
would need to be “blinded” to the existence of the experiment to the greatest extent possi-
ble. The issue here is that knowledge of the experimental conditions can affect the outcome
and that would confound any determination of whether or not RAB screening is effective.
Blinding presents practical, organizational, and possibly ethical issues that would have to be
worked through.
However, as Haggstrom (1973), Haggstrom (1975), Buddin & Polich (1990), Buddin (1992), and a
host of statistical, behavioral science, and behavioral economics literature show, these issues can be
appropriately addressed.
Now, some might reject the need for this experiment saying, for example, that even if it turns out that
the RAB does effectively predict recruiting performance in the field, NRC has little to no control
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over who applies to become a recruiter and it generally must take whoever applies. That may be true
today, but it does not have to be so in the future. Consider a scenario in which NRC learns through
experimentation that those who score highly on the RAB are 50 percent more effective at recruiting
than those who score low. Then NRC, using empirical evidence, could make the case to Navy
leadership that, by implementing RAB screening throughout the fleet and rewarding sailors who
score well and serve as recruiters (similar to what the Marine Corps currently does), the number of
NRC recruiters could be cut by a third without impacting NRC’s performance and ability to achieve
mission. Under these conditions, it could well be that Navy leadership would find implementing
new recruiter selection and reward policies worth the savings in resources that could then be applied
elsewhere in the Fleet.
It is worth noting that these experimentation recommendations are consistent with comments re-
cently made by the Commanding General of USAREC who said in an Army journal article:
As the Army enters an era requiring significant adaptation, research in the human
dimension will become more important. The behavioral sciences, among other relevant
disciplines, can help us better identify and recruit those most suitable to serve in future
complex operating environments (Batschelet et al., 2014, p. 41).
He goes on to say:
A recruiting university would prove an important partner with the Army G-1, TRADOC
and other important talent partners in combining vision, force and personnel require-
ments with military and civilian research into actionable policies and practices. The
key is to establish an organization in which talent acquisition research is transferred
to training and educating recruiters. A revitalized, robust commitment to talent ac-
quisition research, largely coordinated at a recruiting university, would best blend the
teaching and research components of higher education for the total force (Batschelet
et al., 2014, p. 41).
6.3 Other Recruiting Strategy Recommendations
In the course of our research, we encountered a number of military recruiting ideas and approaches
that, while not explicitly related to Millennial and post-Millennial recruiting, we thought were wor-
thy of referral. Many of these are consistent with the 2013 Business Plan which states that NRC
must “continually adapt our business to the dynamic recruiting market” (see Section 2.1 and CNRC,
2014, enclosure (1), p. 3).
In particular, the Business Plan describes a variety of initiatives intended to transition NRC recruit-
ing processes that are “slow [and] labor intensive,” “stove-piped,” and “hierarchical” with “lengthy
cycle time[s]” that are “facility dependent” and “not adaptive to quick market change” into “mo-
bile recruiting” processes that are “fast / mobile / multipurpose,” “responsive,” and “IT connected”
and that operate at the “speed of the market” (CNRC, 2014, enclosure (1), p. 12). Many of these
recommendations also fit within this paradigm.
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• Recommendation 10: Build a robust NRC process improvement program. Commercial
industry and other parts of the private sector have established methods for conducting process
improvement, such as the well-known Lean Six Sigma program. These tools and techniques
could be used to help achieve the business transformation goals described in the 2013 NRC
Business Plan. While NRC has a modest process improvement program that dates back to
around 2006, consisting of a half-time program manager and a collateral duty deployment
champion (Bolin, 2015), NRC could benefit from expanding and formalizing the program.
In particular, NRC should
– demonstrate vocal and continuous leadership commitment to process improvement;
– integrate process improvement into the strategic infrastructure;
– dedicate the necessary resourced to include a budget and personnel;
– provide ongoing professional development in process improvement tools and techniques;
and,
– integrate ongoing process improvement efforts in contracting, logistics, IT, operations,
and other areas under a single performance improvement umbrella.
By way of comparison, the Air Force Recruiting Service has a mature process improvement
program that was used to help re-design the new Air Force Recruiting Information Support
System. NRC should consider using AFRS as a benchmark for its process improvement
capability.
Note that, in comparison to the recommendation to establish a program of relevant experiment-
based research, which is intended to learn about and demonstrate break-through recruiting
innovations, the goal of this recommendation is to make incremental improvements to current
recruiting processes.
• Recommendation 11: Re-establish the various DoD-wide recruiting working groups and
conferences. The military recruiting community used to have a robust set of conferences
and meetings at which OSD, MEPCOM, and the recruiting commands met to share lessons
learned. Over the past five years or so, all of these conferences and meetings have fallen
victim to various budgetary and travel restrictions. While these conferences and meetings
are not under the direct control of NRC, CNRC should work with OSD to re-establish and
re-invigorate them.
• Recommendation 12: Implement a annual recruiting conference with allied military re-
cruiting organizations with all-volunteer forces. In a similar vein, it would be worthwhile
to establish a venue to meet with allied military recruiting organizations, such as the Captain
Navy Recruiting of the Royal Navy and Defence Force Recruiting of the Australian Defence
Force. There are many common challenges that all-voluntary militaries face when recruiting
that would make sharing lessons learned among the organizations a valuable exercise. As
part of this research we found significant interest in this with the Captain Navy Recruiting
and Defence Force Recruiting, as well as OPNAV N1 and NRC N5.11
11Indeed, we even began preliminary planning with NRC N5 but ran out of time on the project to execute the meeting.
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• Recommendation 13: Enact an exchange program with other U.S. service recruiting or-
ganizations and allied military organizations. While this report provides some insight into
useful practices in other military recruiting organizations, it really only scratches the surface.
One way to infuse NRC with new ideas and lessons learned from other organizations – that is,
another avenue for NRC to become a learning organization – is to do exchange programs with
the other U.S. recruiting organizations and our allied partners such as Captain Navy Recruit-
ing and Defence Force Recruiting. As we see it, the exchange would be with experienced key
personnel who would spend 3- to 6-months embedded operationally in a sister organization
and whose counterpart in that organization would embed in NRC. This would undoubtedly
result in an infusion of new ideas in both organizations.
• Recommendation 14: Explore Royal Navy, Australian Defence Force, and other non-
U.S. all volunteer military recruiting models. In the course of this research, we had the
privilege of spending a couple of days with both the Royal Navy’s Captain Navy Recruiting
and the Australian Defence Force Recruiting organization. We found the experience eye-
opening. For example, as described in Chapter 2, both organizations successfully operate
passive recruiting models that, in many ways, are the equivalent in the U.S. of eliminating the
local recruiters, their stations, and much of their chain of command and relying on applicants
to walk into essentially a MEPS station. Similarly, though every U.S. recruiter that we’ve
talked to says that joint recruiting is not possible, the Australian Defence Force Recruiting
organization is expertly conducing joint recruiting. And, DFR has implemented a public-
private recruiting model that looks to be working quite well. While they may not translate
directly into the U.S. military recruiting market or current organizational design, seeing these
different recruiting models operate effectively suggests alternatives to the current U.S. re-
cruiting model that may be worth exploring. And, particular implementation details aside,
just observing alternate recruiting models may suggest smaller modifications to the current
U.S. recruiting model and approach.
• Recommendation 15: Develop programs and tools to transition knowledge generated
through experimentation and data analysis to practitioners in the field via the N7, NRC.
The adoption of new practices is challenging in any organization, particularly those steeped
in tradition with strong organizational cultures. The need to effectively enable decision mak-
ers at all levels to make decisions based on empirical evidence, from either experimentation
or data analysis, is critical to the organizations achievement of its objective of becoming a
learning organization. Without the linkage to a vehicle for transition and ultimate adoption of
best practices in the field, the best experimentation will generate knowledge that fails to be
operationalized.
6.4 Concluding Thoughts
In “How to Lose a Candidate in 10 Days,” Kimberley Kasper provides a cautionary recruiting tale.
In it, she describes how, particularly with the Millennial generation, the most well-intentioned re-
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cruiting organization can lose candidates, particularly the best candidates. As she says, candidates
are lost when:
• Day 1: You post an inaccurate job description.
• Day 2: You decline to respond.
• Day 3: You create a scheduling nightmare.
• Day 4: You make candidates wait on you.
• Day 5: You provide useless and vague information.
• Day 6: You make jobs hard to find.
• Day 7: You cross the line.
• Day 8: You present an arrogant front.
• Day 9: You don’t call anyone back.
• Day 10: You love your outdated technology (Kasper, 2014).
While not all of these are relevant to Navy recruiting, too many have a ring of truth to them. And
this bring us back to the opening Winston Churchill quote at the start of this chapter: “To improve is
to change; to be perfect is to change often.” Of course, Churchill did not mean to arbitrarily change
and in this report we have outlined a strategy for NRC to learn how and what to change. In so doing,
we have made 15 separate recommendations, but these can all be summarized into two overarching
themes:
1. To be maximally effective, NRC and Navy recruiters must have and constructively use the lat-
est technology to connect with the Millennial and post-Millennial generations. This involves:
a. Building and maintaining a modern technology infrastructure; and,
b. Managing the content, software, and social media aspects of the technology for a good
customer experience.
2. To become a true learning organization, NRC must:
a. Establish an experiment-based research program that will explore break-through inno-
vations in military recruiting;
b. Implement a process improvement program that will facilitate incremental improvement
of current systems and processes;
c. Coordinate with other recruiting services to glean lessons learned and benchmark cur-
rent NRC processes against the other services; and,
d. Implement a set of programs and tools to enable the transition and adoption of successful
experimental outcomes and best practices to the recruiting force.
The bottom line of this research is that there is little to no relevant information in the commercial
sector or the academic literature upon which to determine how NRC should change its operations in
order to best recruit the Millennial and post-Millennial generations. And, while the current recruit-
ing processes have served the Navy reasonably well for decades, there may well come a time when
they do not, and by then it will be too late to figure out what went wrong. Returning to the caption
on Figure 1.1 (p. 5): “If you always do what you’ve always done, you’ll always get what you’ve
always got...if you’re lucky.”
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Thus, rather than rely on luck, the ultimate purpose of this report is to help the NRC evolve into a
data driven learning organization that can learn how to best recruit in the 21st century.
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APPENDIX A:
Other Services’ Supporting Documents
The U.S. Military is us. There is no truer representation of a country than the people
that it sends into the field to fight for it. The people who wear our uniform and carry
our rifles into combat are our kids, and our job is to support them, because they’re
protecting us.
Tom Clancy (1947 – 2013)
This appendix contains materials provided by the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps during our
site visits to their recruiting commands.
• “Virtual Recruiting Center” briefing provided to the Naval Postgraduate School by USAREC.
• “Air Force Recruiting Service,” briefing by Col. Bob Trayers and Mr. Atwood Haygood, Air
Force Recruiting Service. Presentation to Naval Postgraduate School at Randolph AFB on 17
June 2014.
• “Enterprise Value Stream Mapping” briefing provided to the Naval Postgraduate School by
the AFRS.
• “Recruiting 101,” by Mr. Steve Wittle, Marine Corps Recruiting Command. Presentation to
Naval Postgraduate School at Marine Corps Base Quantico on 5 June 2014.
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A.1 USAREC’s “Virtual Recruiting Center” Briefing Slides
1 
Virtual Recruiting Center  
US Army Recruiting Command 
Figure A.1: Opening slide of “Virtual Recruiting Center” briefing provided to the Naval Postgradu-
ate School by USAREC. The rest of the briefing slides are on the following pages of this section.
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2 




The Virtual Recruiting & Social Media 
Center (VRC) is a 21st Century 
capability purposed to enhance the 
recruiting efforts of the United States 
Army Recruiting Command and 
adjacent commands as required 
through the employment of virtual 
information technologies.  The VRC 
also manages web based collaborative 
platforms and leverages multiple social 
media activities to support USARECs 
prospecting, processing, Future 
Soldier and Family requirements.  
3 
Virtual Recruiting Center 
•  Army Career Explorer 
o E-Processing 
•  www.goarmy.com 
! On-line explanation of qualifications,  
options & benefits 
•  Special Mission Support 
! Linguist Recruiting, Medical, Chaplain & Officer 
•  Lead Refinement Center 
 
•  www.futuresoldiers.com 
! Future Soldier/Family Support 
! Chat  and forums 
! Telephonic Contact for retention  
•  Social Media for Recruiting 
! Site Trend Analysis 
!  Evaluation of platforms 
!  Mission focused – Middle Eastern languages, Future 



























Talk to Us : 
 Emails with contact  
information and questions 
Request Info: 
Creates a lead and is sent 
email from agency 
Apply Online 
Redirects to Army Career 
Explorer 
Army Career Explorer 
Can test and see available 
Jobs/MOS on live system 
and Apply on Line 
Information  covers all recruiting missions 
Enlisted and Officer programs. 
6 
www.futuresoldiers.com 
Public facing  
Future Soldier and  
Family training; chat rooms, 
and forums require login 
to participate* 
Provides a thorough 
Orientation for new Future 
Soldiers and family members 
One stop for everything Future  
Soldiers and family need to 
prepare for transition into the Army 
*  VRC responsible to operate chat rooms, forums and validate family members 
7 
The U.S. Army 
GoArmy 
USAREC The U.S. Army Reserve AMEDD 
Future Solder Center 
Future Soldier Family 
09L Translator 





Maintain w/ G7/9 
Oversight 
• Does not post content, 







& Family  
Social Media Apply On Line 
 







Need one record  
9 
 
 Establishing a virtual interactive Presence 
 
Population 
• Regional differences are real 
– Local environment 
– Political attitudes 
• Regional differences change 
# of Personnel     # of 
Counties 
         > 150                      2 
       60 - 149                   25 
       20 – 59                    53 
       10 – 19                   141 
         1 – 9                     435 
Where we are 
Where we need to be 
10 
US Army Recruiting Command 
G3 Operations 
Questions 
A.2 “Air Force Recruiting Service” Briefing Slides
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 







Figure A.2: Opening slide of “Air Force Recruiting Service” briefing given to Naval Postgraduate
School at Randolph AFB on 17 June 2014. The rest of the briefing slides are on the following pages
of this section.
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A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 











• Funding Snapshot  
•  Initiatives 
!
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
3 
Vision & Mission 
Vision – the most agile, effective and professional recruiting 
organization in the world  
 
Mission – to inspire, engage, and recruit the best and 
brightest, most competitive diverse men and women for service 
in America’s Air Force 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 





Active Duty CAT I-III  
America’s Air Force Begins Here 
4 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 







A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 









369th Recruiting Grp 
Plans & Resources Information Systems Marketing  
9 Recruiting Sqs 
372nd Recruiting Grp 
9 Recruiting Sqs 9 Recruiting Sqs 
360th Recruiting Grp 
6 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Organization 
- 1,371 Authorized Production Recruiters (EA, HP, & LO) 
- Several Flights located in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Europe 
7 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
FY13!













Recruiting Accessions & Goals 




A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
•  Outnumbered 14-1 by sister 
services 
•  Staff Sergeant (E-5) 
•  Married with two children 
•  30 years old 
•  3 years of recruiting 
experience 
•  10-12 years of service 
•  Selected from among the best 
in their career fields 
Typical Recruiter 
9 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   













































Air Staff, HQ AFRS Division Superintendents, HQ AFRS Chief, Education & 
Training, IG Team Superintendent, Gp/Sq Superintendent 
4,Year!Controlled!Tour!
Duty!Posi/ons!




Career Recruiter Progressions 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 


























A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 







Army 60,490 6,276  10:1 $26,981 
Navy 36,329 2,833 13:1 $14,673 
Marine Corps 30,514 3,116 10:1 $9,853 
Air Force 29,037 1,149 26:1  $8,358 
As of end of FY12 
1 Per Military Performance Metrics website 
2 Per OSD 
12 
Who We Are By Comparison 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 




































FY13 AF 93.7% 
13 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Initiatives 
14 
•  Flight Centric Transformation 
•  Projected enlisted accession footprint: 1100 to 420 offices 
•  Reshape structure to centralized hubs & spoke offices 
•  Reduction of Single-Person Recruiter Offices 
•  Deliberate consolidation; strategic plus-up 
•  Goal: Reduce 200 by end-of-year 
•  Strategic Marketing 
•  National TV advertising unfunded in FY14 
•  Reductions to other outlets (digital, etc.) 
•  Mobile Device 
•  Status Chart 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Initiatives - Flight Centric 
Transformation 
AFRS 2012: 
925 EA storefronts 
183 Flt Chief offices 
15 
Current EA Offices (925) 
Initial Hub Selection (160) 
Initial Spoke Selection (250) 
AFRS 2019: 
~160 Hub Offices 
~200-250 Spoke Offices 
Front-line supervision daily 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Initiatives – Reduction of 
 Single-Person Recruiter Offices 
16 
•  Summary 
•  Reduce the number of 1-person recruiting offices (AETC/CC high-
priority initiative) 
•  Blended COA 
•  Deliberate consolidation  
•  Strategic plus-up (75 recruiters) 
•  Continue flight-centric transformation 
•  Way Ahead 
•  Executing deliberate consolidation – 166 total 
•  Goal: Reduce 200 1-person offices by EOY FY15 
•  Partner with AETC/A1 to source appropriate manpower plus-up 
•  Execute flight-centric transformation in close coord with USACE to 
explore organic opportunities 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Initiatives - Strategic Marketing 
• Marketing funding reduction compounds effects of 
reducing AF presence in communities 
•  Reduces public awareness of AF opportunities  
• FY14 funding cuts eliminated nat’l TV advertising for FY15 
•  Severely reduces our ability to "Tell the AF Story"  
• Reduces influencer support for AF as career opt for youth 
•  Reduces diversity/broadest landscape advertising minority 
communities 
•  Eliminates opportunity to counteract constant negative press in the 
news 
17 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Initiatives - Mobile Device 
 Deployment 
•  Deploy non-enterprise tablet/smartphone devices to recruiters 
•  Determine efficiencies & build business case for future     
  deployment 
•  Deploy ~1500 approved smartphone / tablet pairs to each   
  recruiter as a standard level of service 
 
•  Features / Capabilities 
•  Mobile on/offline access to suite of recruiting resources, tools, & capabilities 
•  Voice, data over existing wireless infrastructures 
•  Application development to build customizable recruiter  tools which can   
 sync to AFRISS-TF 
•  Full reach back support on the road 
18 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   










G = On track Y = Issues may impact FOC 
19 
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I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   20 
A.3 AFRS’ “Enterprise Value Stream Mapping” Briefing Slides
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Enterprise Value Stream 
Mapping Event 7-9 Feb 12 
 
 
Col Mike Vlk 
372RCG/CC 
 
Figure A.3: Opening slide of “Enterprise Value Stream Mapping” briefing provided to the Naval
Postgraduate School by the AFRS. The rest of the briefing slides are on the following pages of this
section.
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A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Outline 
•  Charter 
•  Develop Supply Input, Process, Output, Customer 
(SIPOC) Diagram 
•  Determine Enterprise Level Functions 
•  Determine Sub/Enabling Functions 
•  Determine Areas Of Opportunities 
•  Prioritize Lists of Actions 
•  Parking Lot Issues 
•  Recommendations 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 



































AFRS Recruiting Process Charter  
3"
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Supply' Input' Process' Output' Customer'
Recruiters" AFRSI"36Y2001"Guidance" Planning"" Plan" Flight"Chief"
Flight"Chief" Planning"Guide" Marke?ng" Scheduled"Events" Applicants"
Produc?on"
Superintendent" Flight"Chief"Guidance" Lead"Genera?on" Pro"Superintendent"
Training"Shop" Pro"Sup"Guidance" Lead"Prospec?ng" Inspec?on"Teams"
Schools" AFRS"Marke?ng"Guidance" Lead/Applicant"Sales" AFRS"






Major customer identified through team consensus 
SIPOC'
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Enterprise Level Functions 




These represent the “7” mission critical tasks of 
recruiting 
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Planning' MarkeEng' Lead'GeneraEon' Lead'ProspecEng' Applicant'Sales' Applicant'Processing' DEP'Management'
Annual"Plan"
Development" RGM" Marke?ng" Marke?ng" Appointment" Casefile" DEP"Calls"
Monthly"Plan"




Development" Adver?sing"Programs" Zone"Prospec?ng" Lead"Refinement" MATTRESS" Medical"Prescreening" Shipping"
Weekly"Plan"
Development" Media"Rela?ons" Telephone"Prospec?ng" Flow"/"Trend" Forms" Reserva?ons"



















A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Planning' MarkeEng' Lead'GeneraEon' Lead'ProspecEng' Applicant'Sales' Applicant'Processing' DEP'Management'
Annual"Plan"
Development" RGM" Marke?ng" Marke?ng" Appointment" Casefile" DEP"Calls"
Monthly"Plan"




Development" Adver?sing"Programs" Zone"Prospec?ng" Lead"Refinement" MATTRESS" Medical"Prescreening" Shipping"
Weekly"Plan"
Development" Media"Rela?ons" Telephone"Prospec?ng" Flow"/"Trend" Forms" Reserva?ons"


















AFSO21 AREAS OF 
OPPORTUNITIES 
"
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Prioritized List of Actions 
Priority' Enterprise'Level'FuncEon' Enabling'FuncEon' Recommended'AcEon'
1" ALL" ALL" ReYevaluate"7"mission"cri?cal"tasks"
2" Lead"Genera?on" Marke?ng" Research"manual"NVRA"repor?ng"requirements"
3" Applicant"Sales" Flow"/"Trend" Revamp"outdated"metrics"of"flow"&"trend"
4" Applicant"Sales"" Flow"/"Trend" Eliminate"mandatory"use"of""current"regression"analysis"product"to"derive"expecta?ons"un?l"updated"product"is"available"
5" Lead"Genera?on" Marke?ng" Standardize"across"AFRS"AFRIS"only"school"folders"
6" Applicant"Processing" Case"File" Explore"op?ons"to"increase"availability"





9" DEP"Management" Reserva?ons" Explore"op?ons"of"deple?ng"Q/W"with"reserva?ons"
10" DEP"Management" Reserva?ons" Explore"op?ons"to"book"job"once"applicant"is"qualified"




A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Prioritized List of Actions 
cont. 
Priority' Enterprise'Level'FuncEon' Enabling'FuncEon' Recommended'AcEon'




14" Lead"Genera?on" Marke?ng" U?lize"SharePoint""for"applicant"processing/casefile"documenta?on"
15" Lead"Prospec?ng" Marke?ng" Research"ability"to"develop"electronic"casefiles"(from"applicant"to"BMT)"
16" Marke?ng" RGM" Lead"capture"device"for"field"use"i.e."tablets,"smart"phone,"ect."




19" Marke?ng" RGM" Develop"qualifica?on"screening"for"EST"on"Airforce.com"
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I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
Parking Lot Issues 
10"
Communication from top down 
Flatten Org Structure 
Community relations  
SG Process within AFRS 
PAST Gym Memberships 
Media Programs 
Incorporate Prof Enhancement into Competition 
Team Goaling 
Prior Service Process 
''
A m e r i c a ’ s  A i r  F o r c e  B e g i n s  H e r e 
I N S P I R E  –  E N G A G E  –  R E C R U I T   
•  Explore solutions to “List of Actions” 
–  Assign OCRs & Suspense's 
–  Any additional teams include reps from these 
original 12 for continuity 
–  Impacts to enduring priorities, recommended gap-
fillers 
•  Use perspective of Hub-and-Spokes 
•  Examine “pre-lead” processes 
–  Training, marketing, etc.—any efficiencies there? 
•  Repeat from perspective of recruiter vice applicant—
may uncover additional efficiencies 
11"
Recommendations 
A.4 MCRC’s “Recruiting 101” Briefing Slides
Figure A.4: Opening slide of “Recruiting 101” briefing briefing given to Naval Postgraduate School
at Marine Corps Base Quantico Portsmouth on 5 June 2014. The rest of the briefing slides are on
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APPENDIX B:
Royal Navy Supporting Documents
The Royal Navy of England hath ever been its greatest defense and ornament; it is its
ancient and natural strength; the floating bulwark of the island.
Sir William Blackstone (1723 – 1780)
This appendix contains materials provided by the Royal Navy during our visit to Captain Naval
Recruiting on 20-21 August 2014.
• “Recruiting Overview,” briefing by Capt Mark Cameron, Captain Naval Recruiting, RN. Pre-
sentation to Naval Postgraduate School at HMNB Portsmouth on 20 August 2014.
• “Navy Command Future Organisation,” Vice Admiral Sir Philip Jones KCB, Fleet Comman-
der, RN. Galaxy 21-2014 dated 20 July 2014.
• “Welcome to AFCO Portsmouth,” briefing by Lt Cdr Mitch Vowles RN, WO1 Laurie Moody,
RN, and WO1 Chris Smith, RN. Presentation to Naval Postgraduate School at Portsmouth
Armed Forces Career Office (AFCO) on 20 August 2014.
• “Naval Recruit Marketing,” by Mr Paul Colley, Marketing Manager, Royal Naval Recruiting.
Presentation to Naval Postgraduate School at HMNB Portsmouth on 21 August 2014.
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B.1 “Recruiting Overview” Briefing Slides
NOVEMBER 2009 PRESENTATION RUNNING FOOTER 
Recruiting Overview 
 
Capt Mark Cameron BEng(Hons) MDA CEng MIET RN 
Figure B.1: Opening slide of “Recruiting Overview” briefing by Capt Mark Cameron, Captain
Naval Recruiting, RN, given to Naval Postgraduate School at HMNB Portsmouth on 20 August
2014. The rest of the briefing slides are on the following pages of this section.
109






























CandidateL Focus Innovation% Unity%of%Effort Properly%Resourced
We% believe% that% our%
competitive%advantage% is% our%
dedication% to% put% candidates%
first% H and% to% match% their%
aspirations% with% unique%
opportunities in%the%Navy.
We% are% committed% to% finding%
new%and%better%ways%to%reach%
and% engage% with% eligible%
candidates%– and%to%add%value%
to% the unique% opportunities%
the%Navy%offers%them.







We% are% determined% to% secure%
adequate% resources% to% meet%
the% Navy’s% recruitment%
requirements% in% a% market% in%
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 Wastage Feedback 
Driving Training Wastage down, 








































Defence – Cost of Recruiting 
Element RN (£) Army (£) RAF (£) TOTAL (£)
Manpower 17,387,987 92,839,921 20,382,402 130,610,310
Field Force Property 396,987 7,782,027 1,278,815 9,457,829
Mktg Campaigns 8,206,688 8,510,070 7,797,609 24,514,367
Mktg Ops 2,605,072 256,500 2,344,396 5,205,968
Other 4,631,325 13,368,131 3,627,501 21,626,957
TOTAL 33,228,059 122,756,649 35,430,723 191,415,431
Element RN (£) Army (£) RAF (£) TOTAL (£)
Manpower 20,341,538 94,691,466 22,769,098 137,802,102
Field Force Property 1,319,824 4,433,259 2,343,994 8,097,077
Mktg Campaigns 3,387,656 9,327,500 6,016,390 18,731,546
Mktg Ops 2,239,340 5,240,002 3,137,663 10,617,005
Other 4,729,006 20,903,762 4,435,848 30,068,616
TOTAL 32,017,364 134,595,989 38,702,993 205,316,346
Recruiting Costs 2012/13  
 
 
Comparator Recruiting Costs 2011/12 
 
 
Overall reduction in expenditure £13.9M (7%). 
 
Defence – Cost of Recruiting 
Recruiting Outcomes 
6.  As a result of the above investment, the following Regular forces were recruited in  




Rank RN/RM Army RAF Totals 
Officer 280 640 140 1060 
OR 2490 9660 1170 13320 
Totals 2770 10300 1310 14380 Against the following Regular targets: 
 
Rank RN/RM Army  RAF Totals 
Officer 322 600 260 1182 
OR 2603 9833 1417 13853 
Totals 2925 10433 1677 15035  
 [1]
 DS Annual Personnel Report 23 May 2013 – does not include RFA or Reserves. 
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(To be developed) 
CHANGE PERFORMANCE 
NOVEMBER 2009 PRESENTATION RUNNING FOOTER 
 



















A recruiting target letter for 2013/14 has not been issued, data used for in-year targets is 
the current new entry pattern and pipeline forecast. 
Process Performance 
 
















































NOVEMBER 2009 PRESENTATION RUNNING FOOTER 
 















































































Target RN Ratings Entrants Forecast achievement
Process Performance 
 
NOVEMBER 2009 PRESENTATION RUNNING FOOTER 
 




























Target RMOR Entrants Forecast achievement 
Process Performance 
 
NOVEMBER 2009 PRESENTATION RUNNING FOOTER 
 
RN & RM Officer Entrants vs Targets 
0 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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RN OfficerTarget RN Officer Entrants RM Officer Target RM Officer Entrants Forecast achievement 
Process Performance 
 
NOVEMBER 2009 PRESENTATION RUNNING FOOTER 
 








































































Target RNR Officer & Ratings Entrants Forecast achievement
Process Performance 
 
NOVEMBER 2009 PRESENTATION RUNNING FOOTER 
 



















































































ROYAL NAVY GALAXY 
 
Serial: Galaxy 21-2014    Date: 30-07-2014 
ISSUE: 
 
Vice Admiral Sir Philip Jones KCB 
Fleet Commander 





NAVY COMMAND FUTURE ORGANISATION 
 
1. I am delighted to announce the new organisation of Navy Command that has been 
approved by 1SL and to which we will start to transition immediately. 
 
Why are we changing? 
 
2. The changes are a necessary evolution.  Under Defence Reform, Navy Command has 
been given far greater responsibility and authority for managing both our current affairs and our 
future.  We have risen to these challenges and, in doing so, it has become increasingly clear that 
Navy Command is not best placed to adopt the modern and empowered model that Defence is 
pioneering.  The solution is a suite of coherence changes to our organisational structure, our 
business processes, our governance and our capability management responsibilities. 
 
Navy Command Future Organisation 
 
3. The new organisation of Navy Command is at Enclosure 1.  The main changes are: 
 
x At 3* level, the Fleet Commander has responsibility for the daily business of force 
generation and current operations, and 2SL has responsibility for running the strategic 
Headquarters of the RN including all aspects of managing current and future capability. 
x At 2* level, there are clear focal points for capability management of ships / submarines, 
and for aviation / littoral manoeuvre.  These are supported by dedicated 2* enabling 
directorates. 
x Command of the Flotillas transfers to COMOPS to recognise the synergy between force 
generation and operations. 
x FOST will (from mid-2015) assume the duties of Flag Officer Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, but without responsibility for Regions or Reserves, which move elsewhere.  This 
compensates for the new 2* ACNS(Ships and Submarines), keeping the star count 
neutral. 
x At 1* level, the current ACOS(SSM) portfolio is split in two: a new ACOS(SSM) to focus 
on ship and submarine capability management, and a new ACOS(Engineering Support) 
to focus on cross-cutting matters and engineering branch transformation. 
 
The benefits of change 
 
4. The principal benefits of this change are: 
 
Protecting Our Nation’s Interests 
Figure B.2: First page of the Royal Navy’s “Navy Command Future Organisation” memorandum
by Vice Admiral Sir Philip Jones KCB, Fleet Commander, RN. The rest of the memorandum is on
the following pages of this section.
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x It simplifies our current matrix structure to give greater clarity over who does what. 
x It aligns Command chains and responsibilities to better enable delegation and 
prioritisation. 
x It creates clearer supporting / supported relationships at 3*, 2* and 1* level and better 
aligns accountability, responsibility and authority. 
x It provides more dedicated 2* and 1* capability management of ships and submarines. 
x It reinforces platform primacy by creating specialist, platform focussed, 2* areas that can 
act as ‘Intelligent Customers’. 
 
The timetable for change 
 
5. To ease the transition, Navy Command will evolve into this new structure between now 
and Summer 2015 in accordance with the timetable at Enclosure 2.  Some of the changes may 
happen earlier than indicated.  As the changes focus on aligning responsibility at senior levels, 




6. This is a significant milestone.  While we will never be fully ‘at rest’ in terms of 
organisational design (and some form of ‘matrix management’ will always be inevitable given our 
size), implementation of this model will complete the journey we started with the TLB merger and 
advanced through Transformation and Navy Command Review.  In approving the plan, 1SL was 
acutely aware of, and most grateful for, the time and effort that many of you have devoted to this 









1. Navy Command – new organisation. 
































































1. ACNS(A&C), as the Aircraft Operating Authority, is functionally responsible to the Fleet Commander for 
aviation force generation and AOA duties.
2. FOST, as the Training 2* lead, is functionally responsible to 2SL for the Develop-Deliver functions of Shore 
Trg and Trg Policy.
3. ACOS(AFSUP), as the RFA Flot Comd, is functionally responsible to COMOPS for RFA force generation.
4. Hd Media/Comms is functionally responsible to FD(N) for RN Communications coherency with the Dept of 
State function.
5. The exact future position in the model of 3 Cdo Bde and ACOS(W) is still tbc.






Protecting Our Nation’s Interests 






27 Aug 14 x FOSNNI supersession 
x ACNS(Pers) assumes line management of CMR and 
SRO of NC FR20 Prog Board 
 
15 Sep 14 x ACNS(Cap) / COS HQ supersession 
 
By 30 Sep 14 x Flotillas and Capability Integration Cell transfer line 
management from ACNS(Spt) to COMOPS 
x Hd Media/Comms transfers line management from Cmd 
Sec to ACNS(Pol).  Hd Media/Comms assumes line 
management of RNPT and Regional PROs 
 
By 31 Jan 15 
 
(based on proximity to 1* 
common reporting date) 
x Establish new ACOS(Engineering Support) post and ES 
team. 
x Establish new ACNS(SSM) post.  ACOS(SSM) and 
ACOS(AFSUP) transfer line management from 
ACNS(Spt) to ACNS(SSM) 
x Establish new Cdre Regional Forces (CRF) post as RNR 
FTRS.  FORF title and role disestablished.  CRF 
assumes line management of existing FORF HQ cell, all 
NRCs and RMBS 
x Establish new 1* (SCS) Hd Finance 
x Security team transfers line management from FOSNNI 
to ACNS(Spt) 
 
By 31 Mar 15 
 
(based on proximity to SORF 
reporting date) 
x New 3* - 2* structure established  (Date of change 
needs to remain coherent with Flag plot arrangements) 
 
By Summer 2015 x FOST and FOSNNI merge 









WELCOME to AFCO PORTSMOUTH 
Figure B.3: Opening slide of “Welcome to AFCO Portsmouth,” briefing by Lt Cdr Mitch Vowles
RN, WO1 Laurie Moody, RN, and WO1 Chris Smith, RN. Presentation to Naval Postgraduate
School at Portsmouth Armed Forces Career Office (AFCO) on 20 August 2014. The rest of the








•  Area and assets 
•  Functions of an AFCO 








Lt Cdr Mitch Vowles RN  
Regional Recruiting Officer  





















WO1 Laurie Moody 








Who are we? 
•  We are a one stop 
shop for service 
recruiting. With 53 offices 
across the UK. However, 
not all offices are tri-
service as there is a 
number of variations. 
•  Each office has a 
nominated sponsor and in 





The Main Functions of an AFCO 
•  Process candidates from initial enquiry 
via an online portal, to entry. 
•  The on site facilities allow staff to 
conduct briefings, presentations, testing 
and selection interviews. However, 
some parts of the process such as 
medical, fitness and any further 
selection testing is carried out off site. 
•  Finally Raising Awareness, by active 
engagement with the public through 




Areas that we recruit into? 
•  RN Officers 
•  RN Ratings 
•  RM Officers 
•  RM Other Ranks 
•  RNR DE Officers 
•  RNR Ratings 
•  RMR Other Ranks 
•  RFA Ratings 
ARMED FORCES 
CAREERS OFFICE 






WO1 Chris Smith MBE 






Invitation to Tour the AFCO 
Premises 
 
WELCOME to AFCO PORTSMOUTH 
B.4 “Naval Recruit Marketing” Briefing Slides




Figure B.4: Opening slide of “Naval Recruit Marketing,” by Mr Paul Colley, Marketing Manager,
Royal Naval Recruiting. Presentation to Naval Postgraduate School at HMNB Portsmouth on 21
August 2014. The rest of the briefing slides are on the following pages of this section.
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What is Marketing ? 
It is the business as seen from the customers perspective 




Its all about him/her 
Naval Recruitment  
Integrated Approach – guiding principles 
Customer First  
Royal Navy Second 
  Local Business Unit Third 
IF YOU ALWAYS DO WHAT YOUVE         ALWAYS 
DONE, 
 
YOULL ALWAYS GET WHAT YOUVE      
ALWAYS GOT..... 
 
IF YOURE LUCKY. 
Three Strategic Imperatives 
 
 
   1. Meet Recruiting Targets – sufficient eligible contacts 
 
2. Customer Focused Business -Customer Value Proposition 
The Offer – What`s in it for me! 
 
3. Demonstrate Value – ROI – ERG Efficiency Reform Group 
 
APPENDIX C:
Australian Defence Force Supporting Documents
They waited neither for orders nor for the boats to reach the beach, but, springing out
into the sea, they waded ashore, and, forming some sort of rough line, rushed straight
on the flashes of the enemy’s rifles.
Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett (1881 – 1931)
This appendix contains materials provided by the Australian Defence Force Recruiting prior to and
during our visit on 27-28 August 2014.
• Introductory briefing by CAPT Simon O’Brien, RAN, Director Military Recruiting, DFR.
Presentation to Naval Postgraduate School at Fairbairn, ACT, on 27 August 2014.
• “Australian Defense Force Recruiting,” briefing by MAJ Troy Larkin, DFR. Presentation to
Naval Postgraduate School at Fairbairn, ACT, on 27 August 2014.
• “DFR ICT and Digital,” briefing by Mr. Owen McKerrow and Mr. Nick Rudzki. Presentation
to Naval Postgraduate School at Fairbairn, ACT, on 28 August 2014.
• “Understanding Millennials – A GPY&R Perspective.” Report provided by Australian DFR.
• “Social Media in DRF. Why?” Briefing slides provided by Australian DFR.
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Figure C.1: Opening slide of introductory briefing by CAPT Simon O’Brien, RAN. Presentation to
Naval Postgraduate School at Fairbairn, ACT, on 27 August 2014. The rest of the briefing slides are
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DFR recruits the right people in the right numbers 
 at the right time for the ADF in order to 
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13 19 01 (DCAM) 
Liaison with ADF 






Medical Assessment Standards 
Psych Assessment standards 
Physical Fitness Assessment 
Recruiting Plans & Governance 
= DFR 
DFR = Collaboration 
Candidate Care (CRMC) 
Regional Management 
Recruiting Expertise and 
Innovation 
Recruiting Systems, Admin 
and Personnel 
Marketing & Channel Mgt 
Medical Assessment 
Psych Assessment 
Facilities & Vehicles 
Training 
IT 
Labour Market Analysis 
Target Mgt 
Pipeline Mgt 
Analysis & Reporting 
 






























































C.2 “Australian Defense Force Recruiting” Briefing Slides
Australian Defence Force Recruiting
Figure C.2: Opening slide of “Australian Defense Force Recruiting” briefing by MAJ Troy Larkin,
DFR. Presentation to Naval Postgraduate School at Fairbairn, ACT, on 27 August 2014. The rest of
the briefing slides are on the following pages of this section.
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Australian Defence Force
x All volunteer force









Air Force – 24.8%
x Recruiting achievement (90%)
x Last FY recruited 6036 permanent & 2261 part-time
x Target demographic: 18-24 years
x Increasing demand for technical skills




Marketing and recruitment services between Defence and 












Defence managed call centre for initial enquiries

 
Contractor Customer Relationship Management Centre to manage 
candidate through the recruitment process

 
Sub-contracted medical and IT support

 
Defence contracted creative and digital marketing providers 






























Total staff - 368 positions
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Recruiting Expertise and 
Innovation
Recruiting Systems, Admin 
and Personnel














































CALD (Culturally and Linguistically Diverse)
x
 

































Social Media – Why?
12.8M Australians have Facebook
of people under 30 use 
social media everyday
5M Australians have Linkedin
2nd most popular search engine globally, rich content 





































































C.3 “DFR ICT and Digital” Briefing Slides
DFR ICT and Digital 
Owen McKerrow – NextGen Manager 
(former National ICT and Digital Manager) 
 
Nick Rudzki – Social Media Manager 
Figure C.3: Opening slide of “DFR ICT and Digital” briefing by Mr. Owen McKerrow and Mr.
Nick Rudzki. Presentation to Naval Postgraduate School at Fairbairn, ACT, on 28 August 2014.
The rest of the briefing slides are on the following pages of this section.
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The DFR Partnership 
World’s Largest RPO 
DFR
The DFR Partnership 
Our Service Providers 
DFR HPHavas)Worldwide
ICT Services Creative and 
Digital Services 
The DFR Physical Network 








































































DFR’s Applications Roadmap 
The Next Generation 

























































The Rise and Rise of Social Media 
Where it all began 
•  Cautious adoption – risk rather than opportunity 
•  Fragmented approach to social 
•  YouTube channel driven through mobile growth 
•  DefenceJobs Facebook established Feb 2013 
•  Dedicated resource Nov 2013 
The Rise and Rise of Social Media 









biggest YouTube recruitment channel 
•  Engagement,&publishing,&repor+ng& &measurement&
The Rise and Rise of Social Media 
Where are we going 
An integrated, socially aware, 








C.4 “Understanding Millennials – A GPY&R Perspective” Report
Figure C.4: Opening slide of “Understanding Millennials – A GPY&R Perspective” report provided
























C.5 “Social Media in DRF. Why?” Briefing Slides
12.8M&Australians&have&a&Facebook&account&
Social'Media'in'DFR.'Why?'
of people under 30 use 
social media everyday 
5M&Australians&have&a&Linkedin&account&
2nd&most&popular&search&engine&globally,&rich&content&&
Figure C.5: Opening slide of “Social Media in DRF. Why?” briefing slides provided by Australian























Cost RSVP AMendance Guests ApplicaHons 
Facebook&Ads $&&983.00 130 43 13 20 






























Experiment is the sole source of truth. It alone can teach us something new; it alone
can give us certainty.
Henri Poincaré (1854 – 1912)
In this Appendix, we discuss some of the important considerations when designing an experiment
for military recruiting. The purpose is to extend the exposition of standard experimental design
textbooks that tend to focus more on the analysis of ideal (laboratory-type) experiments, and less on
specific problems in designing real-world experiments, such as those we are proposing for military
recruiting.
D.1 The Outcome to Be Measured
The selection of the outcome in an experiment depends on the interests of the sponsors. If an
experiment is being performed on a recruit, the outcome might be whether the recruit accepts, or
does not accept, a particular program at recruiting time. But it might also be a outcome in the future,
like whether a recruit completes basic training, A-school, or even his or her first term. (Of course in
this case the outcome is unknown until years after the treatment.) It is easier to deal with objective
measures, like honorable discharge, but sometimes, as in quality of life measures, our outcomes
have to be measured by surveys or other more qualitative measures.
It is possible to assess several outcomes in a single experiment, but it is important that the outcomes
are declared ahead of time. It is a mistake to conduct an experiment, and then gather dozens of
possible outcomes and sift through them to see if any are associated with the experimental treatment.
If an outcome is not objective – for example, if it derives from a fitness report – then it is also a
mistake to let the evaluator know which treatment the recruit was subject to. A so-called “blind”
evaluation, in which the person evaluating the outcome is unaware of the treatment, removes the
bias associated with the evaluator trying, even subconsciously, to boost (or lower) the treatment
effect by giving preferential (or more derogatory) to recruits from the treatment group.
D.2 The Importance of a Control Group
It is crucial that any experiment include a proper control group – that is, a group of experimental
units who are not offered the special program or treatment, at the same time as the treatment group
is receiving the offer. There is a great temptation to change a policy and offer a new program
universally, on the assumption that it must be better than current policy, and then to compare the
results under the new program to those under the old. Here the control group is the set of recruits
(or other experiments units) under the old policy, and the treatment group, those under the new. The
issue is that things other than just the recruiting policy were different for the first group. There were
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almost certainly changes in economic conditions, opportunities of other sorts, the distribution of
ratings required, and so on. There will be no reliable way to disentangle the effect of the new policy
from the effect of these changes in external conditions, and therefore no reliable way to evaluate the
efficacy of the new program.
Every experiment starts with a design, and the design is crucial in the success of the experiment
– whereby “success” we mean not more or better recruits, but the ability to evaluate a proposed
program fairly. Part of that experimental design must be a well-defined control group. The control
group should be as similar to the treatment group as possible, with the exception of the treatment
itself. The classic principles of experimental design, each mentioned briefly in the sections that
follow, are randomization, blocking, and replication.
D.3 Randomization
Perhaps the most important principle of experimental design is the random assignment of treat-
ments (including control status) to experimental units. When recruits are permitted to select their
programs, or when recruiters or experimenters assign recruits to programs, the experiment will
show “selection bias,” the name for the condition where there is an underlying difference between
the treatment group and the control group. People are complicated and differ in many ways, and any
sort of intentional assignment runs the risk of creating groups that are different from one another
even before the treatment begins. Recall the example in Section 5.4.1, where states were added to
the treatment group because they had had difficulty meeting their recruiting missions. Here an ob-
served different between treatment and control might have been due to the treatment – but it equally
might have been due to the fact that treatment states were different to start with. With random
assignment we will, at least on average, end up with groups that are as similar as possible.
D.4 Blocking
Often the units of interest are very different one from another, and these differences are expected
to influence the outcome. In a recruiting experiment, for example, recruiting districts might be
quite different one from another, in terms of the underlying propensity to enlist exhibited by the
residents there. So in any experiment we need to adjust for this difference. In “blocking,” we divide
experimental units into groups – blocks – so as to make units within a block as similar as possible.
Then we assign different treatments to the different units within a block.
As a simple example, suppose we wanted to offer four different programs (A, B, C and Control)
in two recruiting districts – San Francisco, where recruiting has been successful, and St. Louis,
where it has not (this is just an example!). Suppose each district had only four recruiting regions.
It would be a bad idea to assign programs A and B to San Francisco and C and Control to St.
Louis, because when A and B performed well we would not know whether it was because those
programs are desirable, or because they were offered in the successful San Francisco district. A
wiser choice would be to form San Francisco into one block and St. Louis into another, and to offer
each program (including the Control) at one of the regions in each block. Then program A would
have been offered in one San Francisco and one St. Louis region, and so would program B (and
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each of the others). In any comparison between the two, the city effects would cancel out – at least,
to the extent that the regions within each district are similar.
To continue this example, each district is to get one treatment in each of four regions. What is
the proper way to assign treatments to regions? Once again, random assignment is best. When
there are differences among units that we know about, we use blocking to be able to compare
treatments within blocks. When we are distributing treatment across units that do not appear to be
very different, we randomize. A good rule of thumb is attributed to the experimental design pioneer
George Box: “block what you can, randomize what you cannot.”
Blocking includes the case where regions (or other units) are selected in groups – pairs, often – that
are as alike as possible in every way we can think of. Then one is offered the treatment and one is
not. Imagine finding lots of pairs of twins, and being able to offer the treatment to a random member
of the pair and not to the other. Hopefully the twins would be so alike that any difference across the
programs could be attributed to the program itself, not variability between the siblings. In this case
each pair of twins would form one block. Of course we do not have matched recruits, but we might
be able to match stations or regions or districts with others that are similar in terms of propensity,
economic factors, availability of higher education, and so on. This is a good idea in theory, but a
difficult task in practice because it is hard to ensure all the factors of interest have been accounted
for, and hard to find stations or regions or districts to match.
D.5 Sample Size and Experiment Duration
The last major principle of experimental design is replication, which refers to running the same
experiment with the same treatment(s) multiple times. In a laboratory experiment this is excellent
practice, since running the same experiment multiple times gives a good measure of the underlying
variability in the outcomes. In the recruiting case this mostly refers to sample size: the experiment
must be broad enough so that the “signal” (the real effect of the treatment) can be separated from
the “noise” (the variability we would have seen even if the treatment had no real effect). It is also
important that the experiment last long enough to avoid being confounded by seasonal effects. An
experiment lasting less than a year runs exactly that risk.
D.6 Experimental Design in Recruiting Experiments
We have described a number of experiments in Section 5. In this section we briefly examine how
they adhered to the experiment design considerations given above.
D.6.1 Variable Terms
The variable terms experiment, described in Section 5.4.1, was the first example of a recruiting
experiment we have been able to find. It suffered from at least flaws in design. First, as noted above,
the assignment of states to treatments was not done at random, but with an eye towards offering the
treatment in states that had been less successful in recruiting. Second, as Haggstrom (1975, p.67)
recounts, the experiment received a lot of publicity. Recruiters in treatment states had an incentive
to push the program as a “one time only” offer; those in the others might have assumed that the
program would be open to them, too, after the 90-day trial phase. Further, the Army conducted
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“intensive recruiting campaigns” in the 3⇥3 states, confounding the treatment effect with whatever
increase in recruiting would have been realized anyway from the increased marketing.
D.6.2 The Enlisted Bonus Experiment
Section 5.4.2 describes the enlisted bonus experiment of Polich et al. (1986). This is an example
of a properly designed experiment. There was a well-defined control group, an effort to block by
differences in economic conditions and propensity to enlist, and the experiment lasted long enough
so that the sample size was large and seasonal effects balanced.
D.6.3 The 2+2+4 Experiment
The 2+2+4 experiment (Buddin, 1992; Buddin & Polich, 1990) provides another example of how
recruiting experimentation can be done well. Again, there was blocking by demographic and other
factors, together with randomization within blocks. In this experiment, the control group was of-
fered the ability to enlist for a two-year term, a choice that had not been generally available earlier.
The result was the experiment obtained a more precise measurement of the effects of the bonus
associated with the treatment group. What is lost is the ability to compare the current control group,
the one with the two-year option, to the long-term recruiting success rates among earlier groups, in
which it had not been offered. But this is a reasonable trade: without this offer to the control group,
the experiment would have been much less successful.
D.6.4 Mailing CD-ROMs
Golfin & Katz (1999a) describe an experiment in which CD-ROMs were mailed to students at
community colleges. This experiment was not as strong in design as the previous two. Recipients
were selected at random from a list of community college students, but there was no control group.
The presumption was that the group of young people subjected to other types of direct mail appeal
would be comparable to those that received the disk. However, that first group was not chosen from
community college students; it included high school graduates and dropouts in the workforce. The
extent to which the two groups differ, and therefore the effect of mailing the CD-ROM, is difficult
to measure. There were practical issues in administering the experiment, as well, difficulties that
are not encountered when experiments take place at the recruiting station level.
D.6.5 The Marketing-Enhanced Recruiting Stations Experiment
The report by Fricker & Fair (2003) describes the “high-tech” recruiting station placed in a Vir-
ginia shopping mall. This was only the beginning of an experiment that was never actually carried
out. The original plan involved placing thirty of these stations. This would have been an extremely
difficult experiment to design well because of the many practical difficulties involved, like the diffi-
culty in acquiring and outfitting these stations in malls that might not have vacancies or appropriate
facilities. In any event no experiment was actually carried out.
D.7 Determining Whether The Experiment Worked
When we say an experiment “works,” we mean that it permits a fair comparison of the outcomes
under the different treatments. In this way, the difference we observe between experimental units
(recruiting stations, say) is likely to be due to the difference between experimental conditions (bonus
offers, perhaps) and not to outside factors like inherent propensity or economic conditions. If we
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can make enough fair comparisons, we should be able to deduce the best set of conditions to apply
in order to meet our needs. Of course the “best” results will depend on the mission, which changes
from time to time. For example, when recruiting is down we might want to apply more bonus
money in an effort to get as many recruits as quickly as possible, recognizing that these recruits
are more likely to leave after their first terms than others might be. Conversely, when the Navy is
comparatively rich in recruits, it might be reasonable to seek out recruits who are likely to re-enlist
at the end of their first term and go on to record a substantial career in uniform.
D.8 Unintended Consequences
In any real-world experiment, researchers must be sensitive to unintended consequences. We some-
times call these second-order effects, the first-order effects being the direct experimental results.
Second-order effects can come in several forms. In the recruiting context, a second-order effect
might be when a particular recruiting policy changes the sorts of recruits who join the Navy. For
example, a more-generous college-bonus plan might attract people who would not have joined oth-
erwise. These people are presumably more likely to serve the minimum time required to qualify
for the bonus, and then leave the service to go to college, than recruits who were planning to join
anyway. So while the effect of the new plan might be to increase overall recruiting, it might have
the secondary effect of reducing the number of sailors who opt for a second term.
A second sort of unintended consequence concerns recruiters. Recruiters have a strong incentive to
deliver the number of recruits assigned to them, an incentive possibly stronger than the incentive
to stick to the experiment’s design for the long-term good of the Navy. It is easy to imagine a
recruiter interacting with a potential recruit who has learned about a specific program for which the
recruiter is unable to offer eligibility because of the study design. Such a recruiter might be tempted
to “game” the system by trading his recruit to another district in exchange for a recruit uninterested
in the program. Experimenters need to keep in mind the incentives attached to recruiters, which go
well beyond ensuring the success of the experiment.
D.9 Analyzing the Experiment
A description of techniques for analyzing experiment results is beyond the scope of this document.
Generally we envision a simple statistical model for the outcome as a function of the treatments
(linear regression is widely used when outcomes are numeric), then use statistical software to fit the
model, then evaluate the quality of the model and, perhaps, begin again using insights from the first
effort. With enough work a model can be made to fit nicely to almost any data, so it makes sense to
set aside a random subset of the data to be used only for the final evaluation.
It is common to incorporate other sources of data into the statistical model. If outside information
is brought to bear, it should be done sensibly. For example, it is always tempting to include unem-
ployment rates in models for recruiting, under the assumption that the military is a more attractive
option in times of high unemployment. It is easy to find national unemployment rates, but presum-
ably recruits are much more aware of local unemployment rates than national ones. In fact, the real
quantity of interest might the ease at which a recent high-school graduate can find a job in the local
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community. Local effects, like the closing of a large employer, will presumably have much greater
effects than the national unemployment rate.
As a final point we note the difference between “statistical significance” and practical significance.
A difference between outcomes in the treatment and control groups is “statistically significant” if
it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. In a study with a very large sample size, even a very
small difference can be statistically significantly different from zero, indicating that the claim that
the treatment has a “real” effect is a believable one. But just because a difference is statistically
significant does not mean it has any practical important. A difference has practical significance when
it can lead to actionable policy changes. Imagine learning that a policy would almost certainly lead
to around a 0.03% increase in recruit success compared to the existing one. (We might not know the
“true number,” but we might have very strong evidence that it is somewhere between, say, 0.024%
and 0.036%.) After considering the costs of implementation and the benefits of gaining a few extra
recruits it might be decided that, even though the effect of the treatment is real, it is of no practical
value.
D.10 For Additional Reading
This appendix is but the briefest of outlines summarizing the main ideas in conducting experiments
and experimental design. There are a number of well-known texts that describe how to conduct and
analyze experiments in more detail. These include:
• Design and Analysis of Experiments by Douglas C. Montgomery (2001). This text is a good
introduction to experimental design and is reasonably accessible to readers with minimal
statistical training. It provides clear and comprehensive information about how to design
and analyze experiments for improving the quality, efficiency and performance of real-world
processes and systems.
• Statistics for Experimenters: Design, Innovation, and Discovery by George E.P. Box, J. Stuart
Hunter, and William G. Hunter (2005). This text is the canonical reference on statistical
methods as applied to experimental design. It is a more advanced text that requires the reader
have a relatively strong background in statistical methods and theory.
• Experimental Design by William G. Cochran and Gertrude M. Cox (1992). This text is the
most theoretical and mathematical of the three. It develops a variety of the experimental
designs that have been developed over the years and it describes the situations under which
each design is most applicable.
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APPENDIX E:
Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Innovation
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